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ABSTRACT 
Rumor in Social Media: Role of Affect During Social Movements 
 
Kaynar, Burak 
MA, Department of Cultural Studies 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Aslı Telli Aydemir 
September 2016, 78 pages 
 
This thesis is a study on the role of rumor in the era of social media. Events 
that have an effect on a high amount of people’s everyday lives always find 
a place in social media. However, the information that is spread in social 
media during such events is not always verified or confirmed by news 
reports. Rumors find a fertile ground in social media during such events. 
Gezi Resistance was that kind of an event where rumors had an important 
role in the social media. 
Claiming that rumor is essentially a negative phenomenon is easy, however 
it is important to look further into the mechanisms that create and spread 
rumors. Galloway’s concept of protocological control describes how 
distributed networks such as social media are governed and how an 
opportunity of resistance to the protocols can rise within the protocological 
field. This thesis shows how rumors can be effective agents to resist 
protocological control without defying their rules and how they can change 
the outcome of events through their dissemination within social media. 
Keywords: rumor, social media, protocol, social movements, affect   
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ÖZ 
Sosyal Medyada Dedikodu: Duygulanımın Sosyal Hareketlerdeki 
Rolü 
 
Kaynar, Burak 
MA, Kültürel Çalışmalar Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Aslı Telli Aydemir 
Eylül 2016, 78 sayfa 
 
Bu tez, dedikodunun sosyal medya çağındaki rolü üzerine bir araştırmadır. 
Pek çok insanın gündelik hayatını yakından etkileyen olaylar günümüzde 
her zaman sosyal medyada kendilerine bir yer bulurlar. Ancak bu olaylar 
hakkında sosyal medyada yayılan bilgi her zaman için doğrulanmış ve teyit 
edilmiş haber niteliği taşımaz. Böylesi olaylarda sosyal medya 
dedikoduların yayılması için verimli bir zemin sağlar. Gezi Direnişi de sosyal 
medyanın ön planda olduğu, dedikodular için verimli bir olaydı. 
Dedikodunun özünde kötü bir olgu olduğunu belirtip kestirip atmak kolaydır 
ancak dedikoduyu yaratan ve yayan mekanizmaları incelersek tam tersi bir 
sonuca varabiliriz. Alexander R. Galloway, sosyal medya gibi dağıtılmış 
ağlarda işleyen kontrol mekanizması olan protokolojik kontrol konsepti ve 
protokolojik kontrolün içinden doğan direniş olanaklarını anlatır. Bu tezde 
protokolojik kontrol ile yönetilen sosyal medyada dedikodudunun 
protokolojik kontrol içinde nasıl etkili bir direniş aracı olduğu ve sosyal 
medyada yayılımı ile olayların neticesinde nasıl önemli bir rol oynadığı 
işlenmiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: dedikodu, sosyal medya, protokol, toplumsal 
hareketler, duygulanım   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2013, Turkey faced one of the most powerful social 
movements of its history. It was the time of Gezi Resistance. On 27 May, 
the İstanbul City Municipality’s contracted workers demolished a wall in 
Taksim Gezi Park and cut down several trees. Although the municipality 
and governmental authorities declared that the demolition of the wall and 
cutting down of the trees were a part of the Taksim Square’s 
pedestrianization project, there were also plans for a museum and 
shopping mall complex to be constructed on the site of Gezi Park, a project 
reminiscent of the historical Topçu Barracks which once stood where the 
park is now.  
‘Taksim Solidarity,’ a collective nongovernmental organization formed by 
professional chambers, political parties, unions, and other 
nongovernmental organizations, was already campaigning against the 
plans to demolish Gezi Park and once the news of the demolished wall and 
cut down trees spread, they organized a night watch to block the 
continuation of the demolition. 
On 28 May, as the bulldozers kept working, more people came to defend 
the Park. Among those new people was Sırrı Süreyya Önder, a member of 
parliament from BDP (Peace and Democracy Party at the time), stepped in 
front of the demolishment vehicles with others. Then a harsh police 
intervention came against the protestors with pepper sprays. Images of 
the police intervention spread through social media and one symbolic 
photograph ‘The Woman in Red Dress’ was taken that day.  
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Figure 1.1. The Woman in Red Dress (Örsal, 2013) 
Police intervention and protests continued on May 29. In the early morning 
of May 30, around 5 AM, police once again intervened and burnt down the 
tents of the protestors. Although the mainstream media continued to 
ignore the events, the news spread very fast: 2 million tweets with the 
hashtag #direngeziparkı spread through Twitter that day, and more people 
came to protest. On May 31, protests spread all over the country and the 
Resistance truly began. 
The summer of 2013 was also the time when I applied for my MA. I was 
planning to study the foreign social movements like the Occupy 
movements and the Arab Spring with a focus on the role of social media in 
such events. Gezi Resistance allowed me to experience that phenomenon 
first hand.  
The role of social media and the importance of digital citizenship was 
discussed much during and after the Gezi Resistance. In their e-book The 
Role of Digital Citizen in the Gezi Process, Banko and Babaoğlan show that 
with the Gezi Resistance the total number of Twitter accounts from Turkey 
rose from 1.8 million to 10 million. (Banko & Babaoğlan, 2013, p. 17) 
KONDA’s interview during the Resistance between 6 June and 8 June 2013 
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shows that 69% of those in the park heard the news of the event from 
social media (KONDA, 2014, p. 23).  
Table 1.1. Source of Information1 
 
However, it is important to note that further countrywide studies from 
KONDA show that 71.3% of the country learned about the Resistance via 
TV (KONDA, 2014, p. 23). It is also interesting to note that according to 
the KONDA survey, the role of social media increases in direct proportion 
to the level of education and income, while it declines in older users 
(KONDA, 2014, p. 24).  
KONDA’s study during the Gezi Resistance also shows that 42.8% of the 
protestors in the park were university graduates, whereas the ratio of 
university graduates declined to 12.5% and 11.1% in İstanbul and Turkey. 
More than half of those in the park were employed and 36.6% were 
students, whereas the countrywide average was 40.3% for employment 
and 7.4% for studentship (KONDA, 2014, p. 10). KONDA’s study also 
shows that 84.6% of those in the park had shared messages through social 
media about the Resistance whereas only 18.3% of people did the same 
countrywide (KONDA, 2014, p. 26). 
                                                          
1 Retrieved from Gezi Report by KONDA, 2014, p.26 
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Table 1.2 Level of Education2 
 
The statistical figures of protestors in Gezi Park and protestors countrywide 
show the important role of social media for the protestors. There were 
twenty hashtags from Twitter that made onto the Turkey Trends list and 
some of them made it to the World Trends list (Banko & Babaoğlan, 2013, 
p. 20). Banko and Babaoğlan’s study shows that there were three critical 
dates in the social media activities related to the Resistance.  
The peak point of all social media activity related to the Resistance was on 
31 May and 1 June when more than 5 million Twitter messages were 
shared. Even though the social media activity slowed down later, on 11 
June with the police intervention social media activity rose once again. 
Finally, on 17 June the total messages shared rose above 1 million again 
with 73.6% of all messages having the hashtag #duranadam (Banko & 
Babaoğlan, 2013, p. 21). 
Banko and Babaoğlan’s study also shows that 23.99 million tweets related 
to Gezi Resistance had an effect of more than 7 billion (Banko & Babaoğlan, 
2013, p. 22). Although the Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and 
Communications declared on 19 April 2014 that Turkey might as well quit 
“www” (World Wide Web) and create a made up “ttt”, no such thing has 
happened. (Babacan, 2014) Rather than the minister’s projection of an 
intranet, during the Gezi Resistance social media users were connected to 
                                                          
2 Retrieved from Gezi Report by KONDA, 2014, p.9 
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the World Wide Web. The huge amount of social media activity and the 
way it was used during the Resistance made Gezi a global phenomenon. 
Several images and statements spread globally and raised awareness of 
the event throughout the world.  
The Woman in Red Dress is a photograph taken by Reuters photojournalist 
Osman Örsal. This particular picture became a symbol of police brutality in 
the early days of the Resistance. It soon transcended national borders, 
spread and became a major symbol of the Resistance globally. (Fisher, 
2013) Another symbol of the Resistance appeared when the Beşiktaş 
supporter group Çarşı captured an earthmover, and used it against police 
TOMAs (riot control vehicles). The captured vehicle was named as POMA 
(police incident intervention vehicle) and quickly became another 
important symbol of the Resistance.  
 
Figure 1.2. Polisticons vs. Dirensformers 
Social media became an important tactical tool during the Resistance and 
not only because its global dissemination of the event. The social media 
activity involved with the Resistance allowed protestors to communicate, 
respond, and produce. During police interventions or other kinds of 
emergency situations, social media allowed protestors to communicate and 
  
6 
 
organize their moves by sharing safe spots, dangerous spots, and even 
first-aid stations. 
Social media also provided a major means of communication between 
those physically in the Resistance and those who were not. Live TV 
broadcasts over the Internet took the place of mainstream media and in 
some cases, even TV channels used protestors’ broadcasts to show what 
was happening in the Resistance. Videos, images, and texts of the street 
events and protests were also able to reach the masses through social 
media and enabled the protestors to communicate. 
Before Gezi Resistance, the role of social media during social movements 
had already become a great concern with the examples of the Occupy 
movements and Arab Spring. However, I was skeptical of the way social 
media was promoted at that time since the role given to social media was 
almost as the role of the creator for such events. 
During Gezi Resistance I tried to follow the events through online news 
sites and social media sites that can be used without an account, such as 
Ekşi Sözlük, along with a few TV channels which attempted to include Gezi 
Resistance in their broadcast stream. I found my lack of presence on social 
media as an obstacle due to the lack of information I was able to receive 
from mainstream media. 
With its bureaucratic sluggishness, mainstream media was inadequate 
when it came to giving voice to the protestors. Social media enabled its 
users to advertise and respond in a fast manner. On 3 June, the prime 
minister at the time of the Resistance “named” protestors “çapulcu” 
(looter). (Kesler, 2013) Even though he tried to insult and tarnish the 
protestors, using social media protestors responded to the prime minister’s 
speech and embraced their new name.  
As in the transformation of the definition of “çapulcu”, social media was 
often used as a creative tool. Through the immediacy and communicative 
ease it provided for the protestors, social media enabled the reproduction 
of the Resistance. Things on social media found themselves a place on the 
streets, and like in the POMA example, events on the streets found a place 
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on social media. These creative processes with slogans, images, and videos 
created the language of resistance in and by the social media. 
Social media activity involved with the Resistance sometimes moved ahead 
of the Resistance itself. The reasons behind the Resistance were often fell 
in background and social media were given a more important role. This 
raises questions on the role of social media. In many cases, new media 
technologies have been blamed as the cause of an event. 
1.1. Power’s Response to Social Media: Cause for Trouble? 
The impeachment trial of Philippine President Joseph Estrada is a good 
example of how new means of communication are seen by those in power. 
During Estrada’s trial, key evidence was not brought up in the court and 
the trial was aborted. Angered by the outcome, Philippine citizens 
organized a rally. The importance of this rally was the fact that cellphones 
and text messages were the main medium through which the rally was 
organized and communication about it took place. In the end, the reaction 
from the public caused legislators to use the evidence and Estrada fell from 
power. Estrada blamed “the text messaging generation for his downfall” 
(Shirky, 2011, p. 29). 
Similarly, in Turkey during Gezi Resistance, Prime Minister Erdoğan defined 
Twitter as a menace and social media as a major social problem. In his 
statement on social media during Gezi Resistance, he further claimed that 
unmitigated lies and overblown information found place in social media to 
terrorize the society (Torun, 2013). Later in one of his party’s rallies he 
explicitly said, “We now have a court order and we will wipe out all those 
Twitter, and the like. We do not care what the international community will 
say. We will show them all the power of the Republic of Turkey” (Hürriyet 
News, 2014). 
I believe that the reactions from Estrada and Erdoğan are very similar. 
They were both faced with a new communication technology that was far-
reaching and easier to use than their predecessors were and they both 
  
8 
 
blamed the technology rather than seeing the reasons why the technology 
was used in such ways. 
Interestingly, two years later Erdoğan himself began to use Twitter 
actively. On 9 February 2015, which was World Anti-Smoking Day, Erdoğan 
tweeted: “Today is World Quit Smoking Day. Keep your resolve and 
#DontGiveIntoSmoking” (Erdoğan, 2015). The end of the Turkish version 
of the tweet he put his initials ‘RTE’ (Erdoğan, 2015), which is a sign that 
the tweet was written by Erdoğan himself (Hürriyet News, 2015). 
Although Erdoğan’s opinion on social media seems to have changed later, 
his speech in 2013 and Estrada’s speech against the ‘texting generation’ 
stand as prime examples of an anti-social media attitude. Positions such 
as Erdoğan’s or Estrada’s might allow one to think that the medium (SMS, 
Twitter) used by the public to organize a rally is the cause of the incidents. 
This kind of approach establishes a cause-effect relationship between social 
media and resistance or protest. Is this really the case? Can we consider 
social media as a cause of popular resistance? 
Interestingly, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and his party AKP seem to 
have realized the importance of social media. AKP formed a social media 
army. (Anadolu News Agency, 2013) This major group of propagandists 
are used to increase the popularity of pro-government posts, government 
activities, and to denounce activities critical of the government in social 
media. An obvious example of the activity of AKP’s social media army can 
be seen on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb).   
On February 13, 2015, a movie titled Code Name: K.O.Z. was released. 
The short description of the movie is as follows on IMDb: “Political and 
social processes in recent and current Turkish political history.” (IMDb page 
for Kod Adi K.O.Z., 2015) The movie is highly promoted by pro-
government organizations and the government itself, while others accuse 
it of being a propaganda movie.  
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Figure 1.3. Code Name: K.O.Z. Movie Poster 
IMDb allows its users to vote a movie from 1 to 10. As of 14 August 2016, 
18,856 users have voted Code Name K.O.Z. Out of 18,856 votes, 15,310 
are 1s and 3162 of them are 10s. Only 384 users have voted something 
different from 1 or 10. (IMDb page for Kod Adi K.O.Z., 2015) The 
distribution of the ratings shows the conflict between AKP’s social media 
army and those who think that the movie is solely for propaganda. 
Online conflicts like the one about Code Name K.O.Z. raise questions on 
how the users of social media act. There are people who use their real 
identities while using social media, and there are also fake accounts, or 
accounts with nicknames. Even though it is possible to gain prestige and 
credibility with an online profile by the contents of the posts and by time, 
there are many social media accounts whose main goal is to troll, spread 
disinformation and rumors. The popularity of an account, the amount of 
people that follow the account, is in most cases more important than the 
account’s credibility or prestige on social media. This creates doubts about 
the validity of the information that spreads through social media. 
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Social media and the Internet both contain a lot of disinformation and it is 
often left to the users to decide if the information transmitted is true or 
false. Anyone can build up a website or join a website and start posting 
content and information. The reliability of the received data or information 
is a huge question mark. The example of the ratings for Code Name K.O.Z. 
movie shows that, rather than being objective and neutral, social media 
users can pursue subjective goals. Conspiracy theories, provocative 
contents, lies and rumors can easily spread through social media.  
1.2.  Information or Rumor? Rethinking Resistance and Social 
Media 
Given all this, understanding the working mechanisms of the Internet 
becomes extremely important. In order to do so I will use Alexander R. 
Galloway’s concept of “protocological control.” Galloway’s study is a 
substantial work to make sense out of the novelty of the Internet and its 
relation to power and resistance. In his book, Protocol: How Control Exists 
after Decentralization, Alexander Galloway defines protocological control 
as a control principle for distributed networks.  
Distributed networks lack a central hierarchy and every agent in the 
network is both a transmitter and a receiver. The Internet is the most 
obvious example of a distributed network. Protocols are “certain pre-
agreed ‘scientific’ rules of the system.” (Galloway, 2004, p. 38) The certain 
pre-agreed and scientific rules of protocols make them accept any data 
that fit in with their rules without interpreting its contents. In this study, I 
will use protocol as the control mechanism of the Internet and social media. 
During Gezi Resistance, one quote in a question form was quite popular 
among social media users. The quote was ‘Is this information accurate?’ 
This quote indicated that the veracity of the information that flowed 
through social media was a big concern. There were doubts on both the 
protestors’ side and authorities’ side about the accuracy of the information 
flow in social media. Thus, an attempt to verify the information became 
very popular for the actors using social media during the Resistance.  
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Rumors were an important part of the social media activity during the 
Resistance regardless of the attempts to verify them. Studies show  that 
in every social movement rumors are extremely important. “Rumors arise 
in situations that are ambiguous or threatening in some way” (Allport & 
Postman, 1965, p. 34). In an event like Gezi Resistance, where the 
mainstream media was unable to inform the public, rumors began to 
spread easily and quickly.  
Social media was the main communication tool throughout the Resistance 
and it also enabled rumors to spread. Oh, Agrawal and Rao state that “it is 
not surprising that unexpected social crises in recent years almost always 
involve high traffic in social media websites through various forms of 
information exchange, including online posting, linking, texting, tweeting, 
re-tweeting, etc.” (Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 2013, p. 409). 
In his study Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, 
Ranajit Guha places great importance on the role of rumor in social 
movements. He claims that “in no country with a predominantly illiterate 
population has subaltern protest of any significant strength ever exploded 
without its charge being conducted over vast areas by rumor” (Guha, 1999, 
p. 252). Although during Gezi Resistance the protestors were not illiterate, 
rumor still had an important role in the widespread usage of social media. 
“Rumor is spoken utterance par excellence, and speaking, as linguists say, 
differs from writing not merely in material, that is, by the fact of its acoustic 
rather than graphic realization, but in function” (Guha, 1999, p. 256). It is 
the “spoken” property of rumor that differentiated it during Gezi 
Resistance. Social media enables its users to share and re-share, and the 
user’s subjectivity plays an important role in that process. It is not precisely 
the truth that flows through social media but rather a modified, 
personalized truth that is filtered and altered by the user.  
It seems hard to distinguish information from rumor. A series of questions 
impose themselves. Is the news itself not an organized and supposedly 
tested form of rumor? During Gezi Resistance, a newspaper claimed that 
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in Kabataş the protestors harassed a mother, who turned out to be the 
bride of Bahçelievler Mayor, and her child.  
In an interview with the Star newspaper, she said that around 70-100 
shirtless men with leather gloves attacked her and her baby. (Çakır, 2013) 
Later the lawyer of the interviewer said the incident was fiction (Radikal, 
2015). Another newspaper, Yeni Şafak, claimed that the protestors drank 
beer in Dolmabahçe Mosque where they took shelter (Yeni Şafak, 2013). 
Later, the muezzin of the mosque denied this and got transferred to 
another mosque (Anadolu News Agency, 2014). With these two examples, 
we can see that rumors can also be used as news when the media 
organization that is publishing the news is politicized. 
Provocation, the big game that is played against our country, lobbies that 
try to stop us from developing… These are some widely used quotes in 
everyday politics from mainstream media to chatter on streets. One of the 
first attempts against Gezi Resistance by the government was to associate 
it with an interest lobby that runs an international conspiracy against 
Turkey’s development. 
It has become a tradition to associate separate events with conspiracies 
that reach far beyond. Media, social media and politicians themselves refer 
to such big unverified information to discredit an event, to create consent 
and to shape perception towards separate events. I believe it is important 
to see how such actions that we regularly experience might have an effect 
on people’s perception of news. I think studying the effects of rumor in 
social media will be helpful in order to understand that.  
Might rumor itself not give some sort of useful information? The role of 
rumor in social movements have been widely discussed by social 
psychologists, sociologists and historians. While, from a hegemonic point 
of view, it has been claimed that rumor is dangerous because it spreads 
false information and incites further disturbance, it has also been claimed 
from a critical point of view that rumor might have a positive dimension in 
enabling people to communicate and mobilize during a movement of 
resistance and protest. 
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I claim that rumors are not solely informational statements but they are 
also carriers of affects. With the rise of social media and with the huge 
amount of people that assemble through social media, the dissemination 
of subjective information has become a widespread phenomenon. Rumors 
find themselves a fertile ground to spread in this new environment where 
dissemination is the key. Social movements today are strongly affiliated 
with high social media activity. The relation between social media and 
social movements enables rumors to have an important role in social 
movements with their role as carriers and creators of affects. 
Understanding the working mechanisms of the protocols that govern 
Internet and social media are important to understand the effects of rumor 
dissemination through online social networks. I will continue the study with 
a summary of Galloway’s concept of protocological control and the 
opportunities of resistance towards protocological control.  
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CHAPTER 2 
GALLOWAY’S CONCEPT OF PROTOCOL 
A significant social event such as the Gezi Resistance shows that the new 
media seems to provide a new means of power and resistance, which 
causes a good deal of discussion and controversy. This new means of 
power and resistance find their place in a different context. 
In order to understand the new means of power and resistance one needs 
to look further in detail to the new forms of organizational schemas, 
networks. Internet and new media are formed as distributed networks. 
Distributed network is a type of network that differs significantly from other 
two network schemas, which are centralized and decentralized networks. 
2.1. Types of Networks 
2.1.1. Centralized Networks 
Centralized networks are formed in a hierarchical tree-like way. The central 
agent is single and it has an overarching authority on every node within 
the network. In centralized networks, “all activity travels from center to 
periphery. No peripheral node is connected to any other node” (Galloway, 
2004, p. 30). 
 
Figure 2.1. Centralized Network Schema 
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2.1.2. Decentralized Networks 
A decentralized network contains more than one central hubs each with 
their dependent own nodes. There exists no hierarchy between different 
hubs but such as centralized networks, each hub has an authority over its 
nodes. 
 
Figure 2.2. Decentralized Network Schema 
2.1.3. Distributed Networks 
Distributed network is a model of network where hierarchy does not exist. 
This means that there are no central hubs and peripheral nodes. Every 
agent in a distributed network is autonomous. In a distributed network, 
there are no prearranged paths for the actors to communicate, in every 
instance they can form new paths in order to reach from point A to point 
B. 
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Figure 2.3. Distributed Network Schema 
A discussion on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of rhizome is also important 
when we talk about distributed networks. Tree-like structures such as 
centralized networks and decentralized networks are called as arborescent 
schemas in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms. In an arborescent schema:  
The ordering is strictly hierarchical, from superior to subordinate, or 
transcendent to particular, such that the individual or particular 
element is conceived as less important, powerful, productive, 
creative or interesting than the transcendent. (Stagol, 2010, p. 14) 
In an arborescent schema, there exists a strict hierarchy, every possible 
action within a network that is formed around arborescent principles is 
dependent to the superior agent. 
Unlike arborescent structures, a rhizomatic model of network brings no 
authority. Like the metaphor of tree they used to describe an arborescent 
system, Deleuze and Guattari use grass to describe the rhizome. Rather 
than one root that lies as the foundation of an arborescent system, grass 
has pods and rather than a vertical structure, it grows horizontally. “There 
are no singular positions on the networked lines of a rhizome, only 
connected points which form connections between things” (Colman F. J., 
2010, p. 233). Rhizome is formed horizontally without a center or a root 
that can be traced as its origin. “The rhizome is reducible neither to the 
One nor the multiple” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 21) . 
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Young, Genosko and Watson point out:  
It is important to note that in new-media theory, D[eleuze] & 
G[uattari] are sometimes treated as prophets of the internet; such 
theorists often point out that the internet functions like the rhizome 
because of its connective and non-hierarchical nature. (Young, 
Genosko, & Watson, 2013, pp. 262-263)  
Comparing distributed networks such as Internet with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s definition of rhizome, one can agree that distributed networks 
have some certain characteristics of rhizome like every agent being 
autonomous and the lack of a hierarchy between the participants of the 
network. However, Galloway’s concept of protocol and protocological 
control shows us that even though there exists no hierarchy in distributed 
networks there still exists mechanisms of power, which differentiates 
distributed networks from rhizome. 
2.2. What is a Protocol?  
In distributed networks there exists no hierarchy however this lack of 
hierarchy does not dissolve power relations within the distributed 
networks. Alexander R. Galloway offers a new theoretical framework in 
order to explain the nature of this emergent form of power that arise with 
distributed networks.  
I think that Galloway’s approach is comprehensive and powerful especially 
because it can bring technical and social aspects together in the highly 
interesting concept of protocol. I will summarize Galloway’s theory of 
protocol, and will show its usefulness in explaining the new form of control 
and in shedding a light on the role played by the social media in political 
resistance.  
Protocols form a control mechanism under distributed networks. “A 
distributed network is a specific network architecture characterized by 
equity between nodes, bi-directional links, a high degree of redundancy 
and general lack of internal hierarchy” (Galloway, 2006, p. 317). Every 
agent in a distributed network is autonomous and there are no prearranged 
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paths for the actors to communicate; in every instance they can form new 
paths in order to reach from point A to point B. As Galloway puts it 
“distributed networks have no chain of command, only autonomous agents 
who operated according to certain pre-agreed ‘scientific’ rules of the 
system” (Galloway, 2004, p. 38).  
These pre-agreed scientific rules of the system are called as protocols. 
According to Galloway, it is quite useful to think about a “protocological” 
system of organization and control with Foucault’s concept of biopower and 
Deleuze’s concept of societies of control.  
Foucault’s concept of biopower signals a shift from the era in the 
mechanisms of power where once power demonstrated itself via 
subtraction. “Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of 
things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege 
to seize hold of life in order to suppress it” (Foucault, 1978, p. 135). In the 
era of biopower however, power does not demonstrate itself by its ability 
to subtract. 
Power over life now channeled through two directions. One mechanism 
acted on the human body as if it is a machine. “A body is docile that may 
be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (Foucault, 1995, p. 136). 
Disciplines are born in that era which molded the human body via 
institutions like school, army, and factory. Bodies were optimized on an 
individual level.  
While acting on the level of individual body, power now also influenced the 
population as a whole with strict calculations “…one would have to speak 
of biopower to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the 
realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of 
transformation of human life” (Foucault, 1978, p. 143). Rise of the new 
technologies like statistics allowed the mechanisms for keeping track of 
issues such as birthrate, migration and public health. The strict calculations 
on the level of population allowed power to shape the society in a new way. 
Deleuze’s term, societies of control arise from the foundations of biopower. 
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In Postscript on The Societies of Control, Deleuze argues that “after the 
World War 2: a disciplinary society was what we already no longer were, 
what we ceased to be” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 3). Rather than environments of 
enclosure where bodies of individuals were the subjects of the power to 
mold, in societies of control power operates in a new manner. In societies 
of control rather than an enclosed environment by space and time, power 
manifests itself by its disguise in a free-floating control. 
Deleuze claims that “Individuals have become ‘dividuals’, and masses, 
samples, data, markets or ‘banks’” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 5). Power with its 
ability to constantly calculate and transform, gave birth to societies of 
control. A society, which is constantly measured and defined accordingly 
with its measurement. These definitions however are not fixed but ever 
changing.  
In the societies of control… what is important is no longer either a 
signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password… The 
numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to 
information, or reject it. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 5) 
Constant surveillance and tracking made upon the population now 
dispensed the need for disciplinary societies. Inclusion in different data 
banks presents different threats and opportunities.  These data banks were 
created by turning individuals into dividuals. The dividual characteristics 
like age, occupation, income allowed the creation of the numerical 
language of control. Dividual’s ability to come across with the threats and 
opportunities within the data banks now relied on that code. 
In distributed networks, protocol is similar to the numerical language of 
control described by Deleuze. Internet is the most obvious example of a 
distributed network. Computer and Internet protocols are very helpful for 
understanding how protocological control works. “Protocols are the 
common languages that all computers on the network speak” (Galloway, 
2004, p. 39). 
A computer protocol is a set of recommendations and rules for 
implementing a technical standard. The protocols that govern much 
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of the Internet are contained in what are called RFC (Request For 
Comments) documents…The RFCs are published by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). They are freely available and used 
predominantly by engineers who wish to build hardware or software 
that meets common specifications. (Galloway, 2006, p. 319) 
In order to become a part of the distributed network, a computer must be 
speaking the same language with other computers in the network and that 
language is the protocol. For the Internet, RFC defines four basic layers of 
protocols. 
2.2.1. Application Layer 
The content is the responsibility of the application layer. It is “a semantic 
layer, meaning that it is responsible for preserving the content of data 
within the network transaction” (Galloway, 2004, p. 40). 
2.2.2. Transport Layer 
It is the transport layer’s responsibility to make sure that the content 
arrives at its destination correctly. “It is a social layer, meaning that it sits 
halfway between the content or meaning of the data being transferred and 
the raw act of transferring that data” (Galloway, 2004, p. 41). 
2.2.3. Internet Layer 
The actual movement of the data from point A to point B is the sole concern 
of Internet layer. “It has no interest in the content of that data (the 
application layer’s responsibility) or whether parts of the data are lost in 
transit (the transport layer’s responsibility)” (Galloway, 2004, p. 41). 
2.2.4. Link Layer 
Link layer is “the hardware-specific layer that must ultimately encapsulate 
any data transfer” (Galloway, 2004, p. 41). 
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According to Galloway, “the ultimate goal of the Internet protocols is 
totality. The virtues of the Internet are robustness, contingency, 
interoperability, flexibility, heterogeneity, and pantheism. Accept 
everything, no matter what source, sender, or destination” (Galloway, 
2004, p. 42). As an example of a protocol, Galloway uses TCP, which is on 
the transport layer: “TCP creates a ‘virtual circuit’ between sender and 
recipient and uses that imaginary circuit to regulate the flow of 
information” (Galloway, 2004, p. 42). 
 It is the TCP’s duty to see if the information sent through the network 
arrives its final destination without any loss. TCP’s general principle of 
robustness is “Be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept 
from others” (IETF, 2014). This principle enables TCP to accept any 
information from foreign devices, and to reject any information that is 
corrupted while asking for a fresh copy to be re-sent. 
2.3. Control Mechanisms of Protocols 
It is important to note that when we talk about protocols, we are not talking 
about a command and control mechanism in a traditional sense. In the 
command and control mechanism of protocols, the commanding agent is 
endogenous to what is commanded. This is done by the larger protocol’s 
encapsulation of the smaller protocol. The data in the smaller protocol is 
not interpreted or manipulated; it is just rewritten within the larger 
protocol.  
This method of command and control makes protocols indifferent to their 
contents. This means there cannot be found any implied, deep meanings 
within the protocols but there exists only a ‘cluster of possibles’, which fit 
into the specifications of protocols.  
Galloway also argues that Internet offers some key characteristics of the 
rhizome such as: “the ability of any node to be connected to any other 
node, the rule of multiplicity, the ability to splinter off or graft on at any 
point, the rejection of a “deep structure,” and so forth” (Galloway, 2004, 
p. 61). Although rhizome is formed like a distributed network and connects 
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any point to any point, with the existence of rigid protocols governing the 
Internet, the idea that Internet is rhizomatic fails.  
Protocols are the agents of power within the distributed networks, they are 
the gatekeepers of the network and dissolve any idea that Internet has a 
rhizomatic schema.  
Protocol is a system of management that only exists in a space 
populated by a multitude of independent, vital agents…because 
protocol is agent-specific, it must always be connected to the 
particular material milieu inhabited by those agents—their spaces 
and their own material bodies. (Galloway, 2004, p. 82) 
One might refuse to use Internet, refuse to join any distributed network 
under protocological control but then one refuses to reach a wide array of 
possibilities. As Galloway emphasizes, “not to enter into the protocological 
community carries such a high price that to reject protocol would be 
foolish” (Galloway, 2004, p. 147). With a protocological control mechanism 
where only those who abide to protocols can have a place, it is possible to 
think that there cannot be any resistance. 
To join a distributed network one needs to obey the protocol. As Galloway 
defines: “Opposing protocol is like opposing gravity—there is nothing that 
says it can’t be done, but such a pursuit is surely misguided and in the end 
hasn’t hurt gravity much” (Galloway, 2004, p. 147). Rather than an 
authority ensuring the control of the network, protocological control comes 
from its very nature. One needs to stay within the limits of the protocol if 
one wants to remain within the network. Galloway emphasizes that 
Protocol is synonymous with possibility… Protocol outlines the 
playing field for what can happen, and where. If one chooses to 
ignore a certain protocol, then it becomes impossible to 
communicate on that particular channel. No protocol, no connection. 
(Galloway, 2004, p. 167)  
Protocological control in social media makes it important to mention the 
role of algorithms. The term sentiment analysis is a recent and important 
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algorithmic part of social media . According to Powell “Sentiment analysis 
algorithms, trained on data that categorizes words into ‘positive’ and 
‘negative, are widely employed in the online advertising sphere to try to 
ascertain how people respond to brands” (Powell, 2016). An analysis of 
feelings is enabled by the sentiment analysis. However as Powell shows 
the example of sarcasm is a big difficulty for such algorithms since the 
negative/positive distinction between words cannot foresee the motives 
under sarcasm. 
Algorithms are developed and tested constantly. They have to be trained 
in order to “ensure that the outcome occurs in the way that’s expected” 
(Powell, 2016). Protocols are formed once the standard for the algorithm 
is set. However after their training negligence can rise by the algorithmic 
design since they are formed to “make assumptions about what is ‘normal’ 
in the world, from faces to risk taking behavior” (Powell, 2016). Since there 
can be inputs that are out of the norm new problems can rise. Protocols 
can block or neglect the inputs they find out of the norm. 
2.4. Resistance under Protocological Control 
The possibilities within the protocological field also allow resistance to 
protocological control. For Galloway, “the nature of resistance itself has 
changed within the protocological age” (Galloway, 2004, p. 150). In the 
age of protocological control, resistance actions should also come inside 
protocological sphere. You cannot fight with gravity but you can still build 
a rocket to beat it and leave its area of effect. Under protocological control, 
one way of building rockets is hacking.  
By knowing protocol better than anyone else, hackers push protocol 
into a state of hypertrophy, hoping to come out the other side. So 
in a sense, hackers are created by protocol, but in another, hackers 
are protocological actors par excellence. (Galloway, 2004, p. 158) 
Hacking and hackers have a bad name for themselves. Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines hacker as “a person who secretly gets access to a 
computer system in order to get information, cause damage, etc.” 
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(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2015), and to hack as “to gain access 
to a computer illegally” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2015).  
Today although hacking has a bad name in general, those who are familiar 
with the term define it different. Aslı Telli Aydemir and Hüsniye Çelebioğlu 
show that hackers are not criminals but they are creators of a free virtual 
world. According to Aydemir and Çelebioğlu, hackers aim to reach out of 
the given limitations by creating new opportunities where sharing opinions 
and information has a central role (Telli Aydemir & Çelebioğlu, 2012). 
In an interview, Richard M. Stallman, a software freedom activist and 
computer programmer, defines hacker as “someone who enjoys playful 
cleverness, especially in programming but other media are also possible” 
(Stallman, 2002). On a blog post at his personal website, Stallman also 
tells that “Hackers typically had little respect for the silly rules that 
administrators like to impose, so they looked for ways around” (Stallman, 
2002). Hackers as Stallman shows are not same foul-minded, evil beings. 
Hacking means reaching a goal with a new way that is not foreseen before. 
Hacking allows one to reach goals within a protocological control in a way 
that is not foreseen by the protocols while staying within the network. 
Galloway shows how hackers work as “Hacker’s exploits generally rely on 
logical force. That is, while physical hacks are often necessary, hackers 
generally focus on the bugs and loopholes of a machine’s logical code base” 
(Galloway, 2004, p. 168). In computer systems hackers use computer 
language, or code. As Galloway puts it, “code is a language, but a very 
special kind of language. Code is the only language that is executable” 
(Galloway, 2004, p. 165), and further “hackers know code better than 
anyone. They speak the language of computers as one does a mother 
tongue” (Galloway, 2004, p. 164). Computer languages and protocols 
themselves are indeed the very tools the hackers use. Hackers do their 
work by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the protocols, finding backdoors in 
the system or even simple nontechnical possibilities that are not foreseen 
within the protocols. 
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In his well-known work, A Hacker Manifesto, McKenzie Wark claims that: 
“Hackers create the possibility of new things entering the world. Not always 
great things, or even good things, but new things” (Wark, 2004, p. 2). 
Hackers constantly test the limits of the protocological control and by doing 
so they unfold new opportunities and threats constantly.   
Again, Galloway puts it as follows 
From the perspective of protocol, if you can do it, it can’t be bad, 
because if it were bad, then it would have been outlawed years ago 
by protocol. Hackers don’t care about rules, feelings, or opinions. 
They care about what is true and what is possible. And in the logical 
world of computers, if it is possible then it is real. Can you break into 
a computer, not should you or is it right to. (Galloway, 2004, p. 168)  
Protocological control creates a playing field and makes it necessary for 
the actors to stay within that field if they want to remain in the system. 
Although it might seem as an overarching control mechanism, which limits 
the resistance, hackers provide an important field of resistance using the 
protocols themselves.  
Protocological control improves as hackers find possibilities that can be 
interpreted as ‘bad’ by those who create the protocols. As Galloway shows, 
it is a pursuit of ‘can I’ rather than ‘should I’ for a hacker. Limits of protocols 
can expand and protocological control can become more overarching only 
by the help of the hackers who test the limits of ‘can I’.  
As I have discussed earlier, protocols create logical control mechanisms 
under scientific rules. They tend to be overarching and expand their field 
of control as new opportunities or ‘threats’ present themselves. Although 
this can be seen as an advantage for protocological control, it is also an 
exploitable vulnerability. The logical control mechanisms of protocols rely 
on the form of the input. This makes them blind to illogical relations, or 
implied meanings that can be found in language.  
Even though natural languages are not executable like codes, in the online 
environment where social media exists they have an advantage. Since 
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protocols are blind to any underlined, signified meanings and accept 
everything that is formatted in the protocols, natural languages can be 
used as a way of hacking the protocological control. 
A distributed network that is under protocological control can be resisted 
within the system without knowing or having any technical expertise on 
the form, logical relations and scientific rules of the distributed network 
and the protocols that control it. Protocols’ ignorance of the inputs’ implied 
meanings enables such opportunities. 
Social media is a distributed network where the input from the user can 
take only several forms like images, videos, sound and text audio... The 
protocols governing social media are indifferent to the messages the input 
carries; they only look if they meet their requirements like the number of 
characters, extension of the file. The implied meanings found in the 
language can become a tool to hack here. 
Protocological control is indifferent to the content of what is shared because 
the form of communication abides by its standards. This creates an 
opportunity for the social media users when they decide to pass 
information to each other in a situation of conflict where the media lacks 
in giving information. Because it is the users of social media that creates 
the content, the flow of information includes subjective information and 
affects, which are not comprehensible by the protocols. I find Michel de 
Certeau’s distinction between strategy and tactic much more useful to 
understand this kind of unique social situation. 
A strategy is formed by a subject with will and power. “[Strategy] 
postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base 
from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats … 
can be managed” (De Certeau, 1984, p. 36). Protocols are agents of 
strategic actors in De Certeau’s context, which define the limits of a 
distributed network where certain rules are applied in order to decide what 
can get in the network and what will be rejected.  
As De Certeau puts it “[A tactic] takes advantage of ‘opportunities’ and 
depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its 
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winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids” (De Certeau, 1984, p. 
37). Protocols by their nature accept every bit of information if the form is 
right. This is where social media users can use tactics in order to hack the 
protocological control.  
[A tactic] must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular 
conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. It 
poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is 
least expected. It is a guileful ruse. (De Certeau, 1984, p. 37) 
One of those tactical tools is rumor. I would like to argue that the rumor 
could be used to hack the protocological control because of its internal 
properties. In the following chapter, I will give a summary on the 
theoretical work about rumor to show how and why rumors are created 
and what purpose they serve and will also discuss some recent 
phenomenon that arise with social media and can be associated with rumor 
dissemination.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RUMOR THEORY 
It is a common phrase, ‘Did you hear the latest rumors?’ So does rumor 
means news or is it something else? What is rumor? What differentiates it 
from gossips, urban legends and news? Merriam-Webster defines rumor as 
“talk or opinion widely disseminated with no discernible source, a 
statement or report current without known authority for its truth” 
(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2015). Is a dictionary definition of 
rumor able to demonstrate the true meaning of rumor? 
Gossips, urban legends and rumors can be seen as news once they find a 
place in mainstream media since news basically mean information that 
finds a place in the mainstream media. That is why verification has been 
an important issue for the news reporters. News media needs credibility 
when it comes to reporting information about events that concern people’s 
everyday lives.  
However, with the emergence of social media as a source of information 
and with changing mentalities within the news media, we find it harder to 
differentiate rumors from news. Verification can sometimes recede into 
background and rumors can spread via news institutions. People may also 
prefer to spread and believe in rumors despite what institutionalized news 
tell.  
Unverified or not, rumors are powerful informational tools that can 
influence people’s comprehension of events and in some cases they can 
become mobilizers for widespread movements. With the emergence of 
social media, there is now a more democratized environment to spread 
information. However, this does not mean that every bit of information 
that is shared via social media is true or accepted as true. 
Rumors are a widespread phenomenon in social media and when it comes 
to big events like social movements, disasters, events that require fast and 
accurate information, people’s efforts to make sense might lead them to 
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spread rumors. Does that mean that rumor is a negative phenomenon that 
needs to be eliminated?  
In this chapter, I will summarize some of the most important work on 
rumor in order to show why rumors are created and disseminated and what 
purpose they serve. I will also show how rumor is associated with social 
media and recent concepts that arise with social media. 
3.1. Predominant Work on Rumor 
Scholarly work on rumor gathered momentum during and post-World War 
2 era. Social psychologists, Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman published 
their book The Psychology of Rumor in 1947 and Tamotsu Shibutani 
published Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor in 1966.  
According to Allport and Postman, there are two basic conditions for rumor: 
story’s importance and ambiguity of the facts (Allport & Postman, 1965, p. 
34). They formulate the circulation of rumor as follows: “The amount of 
rumor in circulation will vary with the importance of the subject to the 
individuals concerned times the ambiguity of the evidence pertaining to 
the topic” (Allport & Postman, 1965, p. 34).  
A rumor’s importance for the individuals related is created by a 
“motivational factor” in rumor. “We want to know the why, how, and 
wherefore of the world that surrounds us” (Allport & Postman, 1965, p. 
37). Allport and Postman also notify that any of the human needs might 
provide the motive to rumor (Allport & Postman, 1965, p. 46). 
Rumor circulates with the interest of those who are involved with it; it 
serves as a tool to rationalize an ambiguous situation. However Allport and 
Postman also note that: “In certain instances, the motivation may be quite 
special and bear no thematic relation to the story told” (Allport & Postman, 
1965, p. 46). They give the example of mere attempt of seeking attention 
as a motivation. 
Contents of a rumor are instrumentally relevant information and 
statements that are unverified. For the individual hearing the rumor, this 
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creates a chance to relate separate events. “In ordinary rumor we find a 
marked tendency for the agent to attribute causes to events, motives to 
characters, a raison d’etre to the episode in question” (Allport & Postman, 
1965, p. 121).  
Rumor is a social phenomenon. Allport and Postman give the example of 
“delatores” (public rumor wardens of the Roman Empire) as an example 
(Allport & Postman, 1965, p. 159). Duty of the delatores was to report the 
issues public was talking about and launching counter rumors if necessary. 
Although news pass through institutionalized procedures of verification, in 
the contemporary world rumors still exist. In the past when modern media 
of information was not available, there was a lot more room for rumor in 
society. Allport and Postman also note that it is possible for the press to 
serve rumor to public in countries that lack a free press (Allport & Postman, 
1965, p. 186).  
Particularly rumors are closely related with riots according to Allport and 
Postman. “In fact, the evidence at hand is so convincing that we may 
advance it as a law of social psychology that no riot ever occurs without 
rumors to incite, accompany, and intense the violence” (Allport & Postman, 
1965, p. 193). Although they lay riot and violence together as if violence 
is a necessary substance of a riot, their finding of rumor being an important 
substance of riots is important. 
Their work also shows that there are three phenomenon in rumor 
dissemination. First of them is leveling, which means the loss of some 
details whilst rumor is in transition. Second term is sharpening which 
means to give more importance to some certain details of the rumor. Third 
is assimilation, which means to change some details of the rumor when 
transmitting it (Allport & Postman, 1965, pp. 75,86,115). 
Allport and Postman regard rumor as an essentially negative social 
phenomenon. “The deceptive quality of rumor lies in the fact that, although 
it is evaluative and inciting in significance, it usually masquerades as the 
provider of objective information (Allport & Postman, 1965, p. 198).  
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I should underline here that Allport and Postman studied rumor in a 
laboratory environment therefore some of their assumptions might actually 
be doubtful. Further studies on rumor shows that it is not necessarily a 
negative phenomenon. 
Tamotsu Shibutani’s book, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of 
Rumor is another important work in the field of rumor. As a Japanese 
American experienced World War II, Shibutani was interested in the 
situation at wartime incarceration. His studies on the exclusion of those in 
incarceration looked into the effects of the lack of formal, verified 
information that is received and how rumor worked under these conditions. 
Shibutani shows that rumor has been seen as false reports and its 
identifying character is the oral interchange (Shibutani, 1966, pp. 3,4). He 
describes the news as information about the unusual: “news is about 
unusual events, extraordinary happenings that have broken the normal 
routine of life… News is that more or less urgent information men need in 
making adjustments to changed circumstances...” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 
40). 
News are in demand when the importance of the events rises: “‘Big News’ 
affects a large public and is about matters that require some kind of instant 
adjustment” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 40). Even when the need for instant 
adjustment is less, not much can be done about the situation, “one gains 
some comfort from knowing what has happened and from being able to 
make preparations for what are to be reasonable eventualities” (Shibutani, 
1966, p. 41). 
Thus Shibutani claims that news is not only that which is new, it is 
“information that is timely” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 41). Distribution of the 
news is also important in this context. It is accepted that news are served 
via institutionalized structures, they can be traced back to a source. “In 
times of crisis, people turn first to these channels, and they serve as the 
standard against which all other reports are checked” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 
42). 
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Despite the fact that the news from an institutionalized channel can be 
traced back to its source and can be seen as trustworthy, there are 
instances when the institutionalized news are not true. Shibutani brings a 
series of examples in which the news lose their truth-value, or objectivity 
and neutrality.  
For instance, news agencies use ‘slanting’ as a common practice. According 
to Shibutani, this is not exactly fabrication; rather “an effort is made to 
create the desired impression through the omission of inconvenient items, 
the selection of details, and preferential placement—‘featuring’ some items 
and ‘burying’ the others” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 44).  
For Shibutani, another instance where institutionalized news channels do 
not exactly tell the truth arises when the story is too good to ignore. “When 
the temptation to file a ‘good story’ becomes too great, unsubstantiated 
information may be used. Such items are carefully labeled: ‘according to 
usually reliable sources… ’, ‘unconfirmed reports that… ’, or ‘it is rumored 
that…’” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 45). 
What happens when the news agencies and institutionalized news channels 
fail to reach to public or ignore an event that is important for some? As 
Allport and Postman have shown before, rumors rise when the ambiguity 
of the situation is high. Shibutani also shows that rumors rise when the 
news is not sufficient, “if the demand for news in a public exceeds the 
supply made available through institutional channels, rumor construction 
is likely to occur” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 57).  
It is also possible that the news institutions might turn out to be unreliable. 
“When institutional channels are discredited, the supply of reliable news is 
cut off” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 59). This also influences the creation and 
circulation of the rumors. A news media can become untrusted if the news 
it previously delivered are falsified later, if its neutrality image is damaged 
either because of the falsehood of its previous news or its relationship with 
those involved with the news. 
The demand for news can reach to a certain point that institutionalized 
news media might no longer be able to serve a satisfactory level of 
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information. “Spectacular events with possible consequences for millions 
result in a sudden increase in demand for news that cannot be satisfied 
even by the most efficient press service” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 61). 
Indeed, there might be situations in which some news media are seen as 
credible institutions for some and untrustworthy for others. Under these 
conditions, people reach the information from different sources. “When 
demand for news is diversified, when a public is divided into factions, some 
rely on rumors and others do not” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 61). 
The demand for news and the credibility of the news are important for the 
creation and circulation of the rumors. “Far from being pathological, rumor 
is part and parcel of the efforts of men to come terms with the exigencies 
of life” (Shibutani, 1966, p. 62). Rumors are actually improvised news, 
information that is created and circulated for a certain course. They are 
created and circulated because of the demand for making sense out of a 
situation when the certain, verified information cannot be accessed or 
discredited. 
Similar to the process by which some news institutions are discredited 
because of the unreliability of their news, the reliability of the rumor is also 
an issue for those who receive it. People do not always accept the rumor 
at face value, and usually check by various means (such as asking other 
people, or checking other sources) the reliability of the information they 
get by means of rumor.  
“Information from all persons is not given equal consideration; acceptance 
depends upon each person’s past performance and reputation” (Shibutani, 
1966, p. 73). Rumor transmission does not automatically begin just 
because there is a lack of information or distrust on the information 
received.  
In critical deliberation speakers are constantly confronted by 
skepticism. Many rumors acquire the appearance of increased 
authenticity in the course of construction through the efforts of 
supporters to justify their views. (Shibutani, 1966, p. 85) 
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Allport and Postman’s concepts of leveling, sharpening and assimilation 
must be considered in this context. In these three phases, the rumor at 
hand is modified in a way that begins to reflect the perception of its 
messengers while also becoming believable for the receivers.  
Rumors are bits of created information that are used to overcome 
ambiguous situations. Rumor as Shibutani concludes, “…an integral part of 
the process whereby men develop more adequate ways of coping with new 
circumstances (Shibutani, 1966, p. 183). 
In their book, Rumor Psychology: Social and Organizational Approaches, 
Difonzo and Bordia also define rumor as “unverified and instrumentally 
relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of 
ambiguity, danger, or potential threat and that function to help people 
make sense and manage risk" (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, p. 32). Rather 
than only having no discernible source or an authority for its truth, they 
give certain reasons for rumor to appear and a function to it. 
Difonzo and Bordia show four main characteristics of rumor: 
 Rumors are informational statements 
 Rumors are communicated information 
 Rumors are instrumentally relevant 
 Rumors are unverified (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, pp. 16-18) 
Rumors are unverified, their sources are mostly unknown or like in the 
context of social media where the source can be traced, they are ignored 
because of the exigency of the situation. They are informational statements 
meaning that they aim to offer an explanation to a situation. They are 
communicated information meaning that they circulate from individual to 
individual.  
Rumors arise in situations that are ambiguous or threatening in some way. 
They are instrumentally relevant in situations containing ambiguity, 
danger, or potential threat. When people fall into situations in which they 
cannot receive relevant and accurate information, they try to make sense 
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of the situation. Rumors are created in such contexts and they help people 
to overcome the ambiguity, danger or the potential threat of the situation. 
In great events where people expect to hear news from the mainstream 
media, if the mainstream media is slow off the mark or oblivious, rumor 
mills begin to turn. Gezi Resistance was that kind of an event where 
mainstream media was unable to inform the public timely. Thus, rumors 
began to spread easily and quickly. 
Social media was the main informational tool for the Gezi Resistance and 
it also enabled rumors to spread. Oh, Agrawal and Rao show that: 
…it is not surprising that unexpected social crises in recent years 
almost always involve high traffic in social media websites through 
various forms of information exchange, including online posting, 
linking, texting, tweeting, re-tweeting, etc. (Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 
2013, p. 409) 
Rumor also functions to manage threat; “it is a response to the core human 
motivations to control one's environment or to protect one's self-image” 
(Fiske quoted in Difonzo and Bordia, p. 15). Rumor helps individuals to 
make sense of what is happening when there are no reliable information 
about what is going on.  
Moments of crisis like natural disasters or protests create a demand for 
information in order to allow one to comprehend the situation. “In the face 
of such threats to welfare, rumors help groups to make sense of the 
situation and thereby prepare for or act effectively against the threat” 
(DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, p. 15). Rumors typically rise when uncertainty is 
widespread in a group or community, they serve as collective problem 
solving processes for overcoming the situation by attributing meaning to 
the environment.  
Jayson Harsin’s concept of ‘Rumor Bomb’ is useful to understand the 
importance of rumor today. In his 2006 article The Rumor Bomb: 
Theorizing the Convergence of New and Old Trends in Mediated US Politics, 
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he shows the usage of rumor as a useful communication strategy in 
American politics.  
Changing institutional news values, communication technologies, 
and political public relations (PR) strategies have converged to 
produce a profoundly vexing relationship between rumour and 
verification, which is exploited by politicians with anti-deliberative 
aims of managing belief. (Harsin, 2006, p. 84)  
According to Harsin, three convergent factors explain the usage of rumor 
bombs (Harsin, 2006, p. 89). Changing news values and newsgathering 
practices influenced by new communication technologies and increasing 
concentration of news organization ownership made the news more about 
speed and profits rather than their trustiness. Rumor bombs are useful in 
that way since they are formed in a stimulating way to catch attention. 
This means more profits and without the need to prove they can be served 
fast. 
Another factor Harsin shows is the increasing influence of Public Relations 
(PR) strategies on political communication, especially executive branch 
information and news management (Harsin, 2006, p. 89). The increased 
influence of PR strategies creates a denser control between news media 
and political actors. The strict control of information allows rumors a good 
environment to nurture with its ambiguity.  
Final factor Harsin uses is the increased influence of war communication 
strategies in democratic political communication. The strategies of war are 
formed in order to produce consent and belief thus rather than the proved 
truth, rumors are widely used in peace time communications to nip any 
questioning of the actions by political actors in the bud (Harsin, 2006). 
The concept of rumor bomb shows how rumors have increasingly became 
tools to influence audiences. During Gezi Resistance, we saw rumors 
claiming protestors attacked a woman in Kabataş, a claim that protestors 
have drunk beer in Dolmabahçe Mosque from the mainstream media. 
These rumors were used to tarnish Resistance’s image in people’s eyes and 
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to mobilize the masses who remained distant to the protests against those 
who were in the Resistance.  
Rumor bombs bring the concern of rumor as an instrument of power. 
Governmental actors and those who are close to government used 
Dolmabahçe and Kabataş incidents intensely against Gezi Resistance to 
discredit it. Star newspaper’s interview with Zehra Develioğlu was falsified 
later with the lawyer of the interviewer claiming the incident was fiction 
(Radikal, 2015). We can see that rumors can be used as news when the 
media organization that is publishing the news is politicized. The effects of 
Kabataş incident spread to streets and social media regardless of it being 
disproved later. It is still used as an example to discredit Gezi Resistance. 
3.2. Critical Work on Rumor 
To understand rumor’s role in social movements, insurgencies, resistances 
and riots it is important to have a look at the history of rumors in such 
circumstances. Ranajit Guha’s work Elementary Aspects of Peasant 
Insurgency in Colonial India shows how rumors were created and circulated 
in times of insurgencies. Guha claims that rumor is the “classical form of 
the anonymous speech” (Guha, 1999, p. 251).  
Guha argues that “rumour is both a universal and necessary carrier of 
insurgency in any pre-industrial, pre-literate society” (Guha, 1999, p. 
251). He further continues to describe the role of rumor as “For in no 
country with a predominantly illiterate population has subaltern protest of 
any significant strength ever exploded without its charge being conducted 
over vast areas by rumour (Guha, 1999, p. 252). His analysis on pre-
industrial, illiterate colonial Indian societies further includes: 
 “…subaltern population depend almost exclusively on visual and 
non-graphic verbal signals for communication among themselves, 
and between these two again rather more on the latter because of 
the relatively greater degree of its versatility and comprehensibility.” 
(Guha, 1999, p. 256)  
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Participants of Gezi Resistance were, unlike the pre-industrial, illiterate 
population of colonial India, which Guha wrote about. They were urban and 
well educated as KONDA’s study shows. The type of communication 
protestors used is also different from Guha’s claims in this kind of a 
population.  
With the advancements in communication technologies back from when 
the Internet and mobile phones took their place in everyday practices, the 
pace and the ways of communication has changed a lot. With the 
capabilities of mobile devices and the opportunities that come with social 
media at our hands, any form that is accepted by the protocols can be used 
in a very fast and very overarching way. Protestors in Gezi Resistance 
girded on technological devices, they were active social media users. The 
communication method and the cultural products of Gezi Resistance used 
every format that is available via the devices that were available at that 
time. 
Rather than an alarmist aspect of rumor that premises a destructive, 
harmful event, Guha talks about the positive aspects of rumor in 
insurgencies. “the anonymous verbal signal helped not merely to frighten 
those against whom a particular insurrection or jacquerie was directed, but 
above all, to spread the message of revolt among people” (Guha, 1999, 
pp. 254-255). Today with social media’s overarching user base, it is faster 
and easier to spread the message of any social movement. 
The role Internet and social media covered in our lives gave birth to new 
terms about communication such as the viral phenomenon. I will cover the 
subject of virality later more in detail. However, it is important to note that 
the capabilities of Internet and social media allowed such a phenomenon 
to rise. Viral is a term that is widely used by corporate marketing effort in 
ways like ‘going viral’, ‘viral marketing’, etc. 
Viral takes its name by its contagion through social networks. The content 
that goes viral reaches a vast amount of people in a very short time like a 
virus outbreak. The message spreading role Guha gave to rumor in social 
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movements canbe seen as an example of a content going viral which 
makes me think on the relationship between rumor and virality.  
The message that is spread via the rumor carries as Guha shows, “hopes 
and fears, of visions of doomsdays and golden ages, of secular objectives 
and religious longings, all of which made up the stuff that fired the minds 
of men” (Guha, 1999, p. 256). This aspect of rumor according to Guha is 
the role of the trigger and mobilizer. 
Guha’s analysis of the rumor in insurgencies covers it as speech in a 
different sense. According to Guha: “Rumour is spoken utterance par 
excellence, and speaking, as linguists say, differs from writing not merely 
in material, that is, by the fact of its acoustic rather than graphic 
realization, but in function (Guha, 1999, p. 256). Rumor as speech the way 
Guha defines it should be seen in a different context, in the context of its 
function. 
Gayatri Chakrovarty Spivak offers a discussion of Guha’s approach in her 
essay titled Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Histography. Arguing 
against Guha’s concept of rumor as spoken utterance, Spivak claims that: 
“it must be seen that its [rumor’s] ‘functional immediacy’ is its non-
belonging to any one voice-consciousness (Spivak, 2006, p. 213). 
According to Spivak this non-belonging to any one voice-consciousness is 
the signal characteristics of writing. Rumor belongs to everyone that is 
concerned with it just as the text belongs to each reader. Spivak further 
argues that “rumor evokes comradeship because it belongs to every 
‘reader’ or ‘transmitter’” (Spivak, 2006, p. 213). 
I think from both the term, spoken utterance par excellence by Guha and 
Spivak’s words on rumor being writing gives the same functional property 
to rumor. As Allport and Postman showed, a rumor goes through several 
stages: leveling, sharpening and assimilation. Guha also indicates that:  
The aperture which it [rumor] has built into by virtue of anonymity 
permits its message to be contaminated by the subjectivity of each 
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of its speakers and modified as any of them would want to embellish 
or amend it in the course of transmission. (Guha, 1999, p. 261)  
This contamination or alteration of the message is a combination of 
leveling, sharpening and assimilation terms proposed by Allport and 
Postman. Guha uses the term ‘plasticity’ in place of them. Plasticity of the 
rumor enables it to vary in order to appeal to a varying range of people. 
This allows rumor to mobilize different sets of groups by addressing their 
sensitivities.  
The trustworthiness of rumor may not be an urgent issue for the receiver 
if the topic of rumor has a strong concern for him or her, and if he or she 
feels strong about it. A good example of this is the cutting of trees at the 
Gezi park: people who have a particular ecological concern reacted strongly 
to the news spread in town that they are cutting the trees at Gezi.  
Rumor’s functional role is enabled by what Guha defines as plasticity. It 
carries the affects of people about rumor’s topic and it can be modified in 
ways to influence more and more people. 
In his well-known work Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 
Transcripts, James C. Scott examines the role of rumor for the subordinate 
groups. In a footnote Scott claims:  
The power to gossip is more democratically distributed than power, 
property, and income and, certainly, than the freedom to speak 
openly. I do not mean to imply that gossip cannot and is not used 
by superiors to control subordinates, only that resources on this 
particular field of struggle are relatively more favorable to 
subordinates. Some people's gossip is weightier than that of others, 
and, providing we do not confuse status with mere public deference, 
one would expect that those with high personal status would be the 
most effective gossipers. (Scott, 1990, p. 142) 
Scott shows that the resources to gossip are more equally distributed. The 
differentiation he makes between personal status and public deference is 
about the division between general and private spaces. One can have a 
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higher personal status in his local space even though he belongs to a lower 
class, this is the personal status Scott mentions.  
Rumors are created when the event is important and the situation 
regarding the event is ambiguous. Scott gives the examples about life 
threatening events: war, epidemic, famine, and riot as ‘fertile social sites’ 
for rumors to appear. Like the other scholarly work on rumor, Scott shows 
that “…one must expect rumors to take quite divergent forms depending 
on what class, strata, region, or occupation they are circulating in” (Scott, 
1990, p. 145). 
This democratic distribution of gossip is applicable for rumor too since it is 
the language that allows one to gossip or rumor. Today where social media 
is a widely used phenomenon that is available to everyone who has a 
connection to the Internet, we can say that ability to rumor is much more 
democratized that many other things.  
3.3. Rumor on Social Media 
A number of studies address the role of rumor in social media during crises. 
As the scholarly work on rumor shows, rumors tend to arise in the 
situations where the chance to reach credible information regarding the 
situation is low. Liu, Burton-Jones, and Xu’s  study on rumor transmission 
and retransmission on social media looks into the factors regarding 
rumormongering.  
Their study show that the most important factor on rumormongering is the 
sender’s credibility followed by the attractiveness of the content (Liu et al., 
p. 11). The work of Oh, Agrawal and, Rao shows the factors leading to 
rumormongering on social media. Their findings show that “while content 
ambiguity does not contribute to rumormongering, source ambiguity does 
so very significantly.” (Oh et al., 2013, p. 418)  
Oh et al.’s study included posts on Twitter that were developed for content 
ambiguity. These posts were consisted of information-seeking efforts and 
doubts on several Twitter posts. Their findings show that “The tone of the 
messages signals that they were not persuasive statements intended to 
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make others believe and spread the received messages” (Oh et al., 2013, 
p. 418). They concluded that the content ambiguity related social media 
posts are an effort to make sense out of the situation and have no effect 
on rumor transmission. 
Oh, et al.’s study also included posts on Twitter about source ambiguity. 
They define source ambiguity of a message as “messages [that] frequently 
resembled third-person situation reports without sources being attached” 
(Oh et al., 2013, p. 418). Since these posts looked like news reports, Oh 
et al. conclude that they might have an impact on rumormongering. 
These studies show that the tone and aim of a message has a big impact 
on whether it will be circulated on social media or not. A message that is 
not formed in a persuasive tone and which does not look like a news text 
has a lower chance to spread whereas a message that is formed in the 
opposite way, which is formed as if it were a news report with a persuasive 
tone, has a higher chance to circulate in social media. 
Erkan Saka shows that in crisis situations, storytelling is more effective 
than normative journalism because it involves witnessing (Saka, 2015). 
Similar to Oh, et al.’s findings, witness reports when they are formed like 
news can have higher chance of dissemination on social media.  
Saka also notes that Twitter interface beclouds the attempts on verification 
when a message is overly retweeted or when its creators involvement with 
the content is high (Saka, 2015). Claiming to be a witness can create the 
impression of involvement and may result in increased rumor 
dissemination.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RUMOR AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Networks of communication cover the spaces of everyday life without being 
noticed in most cases. After the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 
Jussi Parikka’s article ‘Earwitnesses of a Coup Night: The Many Media 
Infrastructures of Social Action’ shows the importance of another 
phenomenon which he calls as ‘soundscape of the coup’. 
Parikka shows the importance sound had during the failed attempt and 
how networks of sound became very significant once they were called 
upon. President Erdoğan’s call to streets via Facetime (Reuters, 2016) on 
a TV broadcast triggered a chain of events which greatly influenced the 
outcome of the attempted coup d’état. 
But there was more to the call than the ringtone of an individual 
smartphone. In other words, the chain of media triggers ranged from 
the corporate digital videotelephony to television broadcasting to the 
infrastructures of the mosques to people on the streets tweeting, 
filming, messaging and posting on social media. (Parikka, 2016) 
Erdoğan’s voice over Facetime on a TV broadcast ignited events wherein 
mosques all around the country began to use their minaret networks as 
means of broadcasting Erdoğan’s call countrywide.  
The thousands of Istanbul mosques became itself an explicit “sonic 
social network” where the average estimated reach (300 meters) of 
sound from the minarets is too important of a detail to neglect when 
one wants to understand architecture as solidifying social networks 
in contemporary Turkey. (Parikka, 2016) 
Parikka’s work show another important factor in the dissemination of 
information, which is earwitnessing. Networks of sound that surround us 
cannot always be noticeable. However, in situations that need immediate 
response such networks can suddenly become effective tools of 
information. 
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Social media are ever present with the mobile devices that sustain people’s 
connection to Internet at all times. They became an integral part of 
everyday life and moved beyond being separate virtual spaces that 
demand an effort to access. Dahlgren shows that “the overall ubiquity of 
social media means that they are not just something people “visit” on 
occasion in order to seek something special, they form increasingly a 
central terrain of our daily lives” (Dahlgren, 2014, p. 196). 
According to the data from September 2015, Facebook has 1,440,000,000 
monthly active users (Statistic Brain, 2016) whereas according to the data 
from its corporate page, Twitter has 320,000,000 monthly active users. 
(Twitter, 2016) Social media now covers the place of the old ways of public 
forums where around 1 out of 5 people living on the planet assemble 
globally and have a chance to get in touch. There is an average of 500 
million Tweets per day (Social Bakers, 2016).  Whereas in Facebook in 
2015 January, 1.3 million pieces of content is shared in every minute 
(Emge, 2015). 
Social media are an important field for political participation and activism. 
Dahlgren claims that Internet, with its huge variety and amount of content 
on every scale of politics, makes a great improvement to the public sphere 
(Dahlgren, 2005). According to study by Banaji & Buckingham “The 
Internet emerged…as an important mobilization tool for young people who 
are already engaged in civic or political activities offline” (Banaji & 
Buckingham, 2013, p. 155). Their study also shows that Internet is seen 
as a cheap and efficient mean of communication to reach young people by 
political organizations (Banaji & Buckingham, 2013, p. 156). 
Apart from being a mobilization tool for those who are involved with 
activism, social media enables an opportunity to reach others. According 
to Telli Aydemir in Twitter political hashtags tend to be more persistent 
than other types, which means that they are more likely to spread (Telli 
Aydemir, 2013).  She further concludes that users of Twitter who at first 
do not prefer joining a conversation on a sensitive topic become more likely 
to join as they see more people becoming involved in the topic (Telli 
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Aydemir, 2013). Social media can be useful for activists when they wish to 
reach other people as the survey by Fuchs shows 
69.5% of the survey respondents said that the big advantage of 
commercial social media such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter is 
that activists can reach out to the public and everyday people. 
Typically, respondents argued that “all the activists are already there 
[on social media], but so are regular people. (Fuchs, 2014, p. 88) 
Social media enable activists to reach other people because of the easiness 
to access. The ability to use social media is more democratically distributed 
than many other opportunities since everyone with an active Internet 
connection can join those networks. According to Dahlgren social media 
enables 
[…] a capacity to facilitate horizontal communication: people and 
organizations can directly link up with each other for purposes of 
sharing information as well as affect, for providing mutual support, 
organizing, mobilizing, or solidifying collective identities. This 
feature makes them well-suited as civic media.  
(Dahlgren, 2012, p. 5) 
Dahlgren further shows the importance of the discursive properties of 
social media. He claims that with social media covering a central terrain of 
our lives, “they offer possibilities that are harnessed and mobilised in 
varying ways, and thus impact on the strategies and tactics of everyday 
life and the frames of reference that provide them with meaning” 
(Dahlgren, 2014, p. 196).  
Discursive properties of social media as Dahlgren further notes also 
operate in the realm of affect. 
It is important to keep in mind that these discursive currents do not 
only operate as formal ideas, but also in the realm of affect, not least 
at the unconscious level. Fears, desires, anxieties, conflicts, denials, 
repressions—all these mechanisms can be present in the practices 
we enact in social media. (Dahlgren, 2014, p. 200) 
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In their book chapter on emotions and social movements Goodwin and 
Jasper claim that “some emotions form the raw materials for movement 
sympathy and recruitment. These may consist of cultural sensibilities such 
as compassion for different groups, or it may consist of individual 
personality dynamics—as well as an interaction between the two (Goodwin 
& Jasper, 2006, p. 618). They further argue that “shifts in emotions and 
their expression have created new vocabularies of motive, new subjects, 
and new targets of protest (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006, p. 618). 
Emphasizing the distinction between affect and emotion is important. 
Goodwin & Jasper analyze the emotions as the raw materials social 
movements. However I think emotions lie between affects and 
movements, and they should be seen as mediators rather than raw 
materials of movement. On the other hand Shouse claims that affect “is a 
non-conscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and 
unstructured potential” (Shouse, 2005) whereas emotions are “the 
projection/display of a feeling” (Shouse, 2005) 
Affects have become an important research topic nowadays. According to 
Colman “The Deleuzian sense of affect is to be distinguished as a 
philosophical concept that indicates the result of the interaction of bodies; 
an affective product” (Colman, 2010, p. 12) She further continues:  
Within a Deleuzian framework, affect operates as a dynamic of 
desire within any assemblage to manipulate meaning and relations, 
inform and fabricate desire, and generate intensity – yielding 
different affects in any given situation or event.  
(Colman, 2010, p. 13) 
Brian Massumi’s work on affect is one of the most known contributions to 
the study of affect. According to Massumi “Aﬀects are virtual synesthetic 
perspectives anchored in (functionally limited by) the actually existing, 
particular things that embody them” (Massumi, 2002, p. 35). Affects are 
potentials that can turn cognition and perception yet for Massumi “formed, 
qualifed, situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling functions of actual 
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connection or blockage arc the capture and closure of affect” (Massumi, 
2002, p. 35). 
Massumi further analyzes affect with the help of quantum physics and the 
undecidability in cognition and interpretation.  
Each individual and collective human level has its own peculiar 
"quantum" mode; various forms of undecidability in logical and 
signifying systems are joined by emotion on the psychological level, 
resistance on the political level, the specter of crisis haunting 
capitalist economics, and so forth. These modes are fed back and 
fed forward into one another, echoes of each other one and all. 
(Massumi, 2002, p. 37) 
In this thesis, my understanding of the affect is as potential. Affects have 
an important role in one’s comprehension of the world. Rather than seeing 
a direct relationship between form and content, with the affective 
properties content can exceed its predicted definition in the semantics and 
can exceed in resulting illogical relations and unexpected outcomes.   
4.1. Virality, Spreadablity, and Rumor 
Viral is a term that gained popularity with the rise of social networks. Going 
viral means that the content turns into a contagion within the network it is 
shared in. Viral has become the main term to describe how information, 
advertisements, and thoughts spread from person to person. Virus as the 
metaphor to describe how human interactions through social networks 
propagate has created the term viral.  
Contents that go viral online can be seen in a wide range of categories. 
They can be in forms that are applicable to the protocols governing the 
web like text, image, video, sound, etc. The spread of viral contents’ can 
seek goals like marketing, activism but they can also be only about 
entertainment. They are cultural reflections on the web that show how fast 
and wide ideas can spread. 
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Parikka shows that viral has another important role “viruses, then, are seen 
also as a kind of a memory of their environment and the ethology of their 
host. What they reveal are movements and connections” (Parikka, 2007, 
p. 289). If one looks on the history of the viral content on the web, one 
would find a summary from cultural artifacts to political discussions. 
The term viral causes one to think that the content itself can spread in 
nurturing environments and the hosts that spread it have no role in its 
dissemination. In their work Spreadable Media: Creating Value and 
Meaning in a Networked Culture; Jenkins, Ford and Green opposes this 
idea. According to Jenkins, Ford and Green: “Viral metaphors do capture 
the speed with which new ideas circulate through the Internet.” (Jenkins, 
et al., 2013, p. 17)  
Rather than describing the new situation with the metaphor of virus where 
one might think that the audience has no control over the dissemination of 
the content Jenkins, et al. prefers to use the term spreadable: 
Audience members are using the media texts at their disposal to 
forge connections with each other, to mediate social relations and 
make meaning of the world around them. Both individually and 
collectively, they exert agency in the spreadability model. They are 
not merely impregnated with media messages, nor are they at the 
service of the brand; rather, they select material that matters to 
them from the much broader array of media content on offer (which 
now includes audience creations alongside industrially produced 
works). They do not simply pass along static texts; they transform 
the material through active production processes or through their 
own critiques and commentary, so that it better serves their own 
social and expressive needs. (Jenkins et al., 2013, p. 294) 
The processes of leveling, sharpening and assimilation or the term 
plasticity can be seen in the spreadability model. The content does not 
spread like a virus outbreak, it rather spreads with the conscious 
participation of the audiences where the content is changed and altered. 
An active participation of the audience means that whatever the goals one 
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might have while spreading a content, people will not accept it in face value 
they would rather critically deliberate it and might choose to spread it. 
Content—in whole or through quotes—does not remain in fixed 
borders but rather circulates in unpredicted and often unpredictable 
directions, not the product of top-down design but rather the result 
of a multitude of local decisions made by autonomous agents 
negotiating their way through diverse cultural spaces. (Jenkins et 
al., 2013, p. 294)  
Rumors are agents of language, which owe their existence to their 
spreadability. They need a public forum to come into existence. Like rumor, 
viral or spreadable contents exist only if they spread, they are named after 
their ability to spread. They both need the public forum in which they can 
nurture. This new place where people assemble is now the social media. 
Like viral and spreadable content, rumors must now find a place in social 
media in order to exist. 
As the studies of rumor shows they are not accepted with their face value 
and go through critical deliberation of the audiences they aim to spread. 
Likewise, the spreadable media contents go through same processes. It 
can be said that virality or spreadability terms, which arose with the 
Internet and social media have their roots in the Colonial Indian bazaar or 
Turkish coffeehouse where rumors were born and disseminated, the public 
forums of history, rumor in many ways is the ancestor of these new terms.  
I prefer to use the term spreadable rather than virality. Since as in "rumor", 
I believe human actors participating in a content’s dissemination have an 
active role. Spreadable contents have their roots in the rumor more 
specifically in rumor’s need of dissemination. Bazaar or coffee house was 
once the place of social interaction and word of mouth was the medium in 
which rumor spread. Whereas today the public forum is the social media 
and rumor has evolved. Spreadability is not a new phenomenon that came 
into existence with the rise of networks. It is the mechanisms of rumor that 
has evolved to adept in the new conditions of existence. Rumor’s 
dissemination is now through social media. 
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4.2. How Rumors Spread Through Social Media 
There are two parties in information transmission: the transmitter and the 
receiver. In terms of rumor, once the receiver becomes the transmitter 
rumor mills begins to turn. Spivak argues that rumor does not involve a 
voice-consciousness, which gives it the properties of writing. With a clever 
trick, she shows how the rumors begin to spread by telling “rumor evokes 
comradeship because it belongs to every ‘reader’ or ‘transmitter’” (Spivak, 
2006, p. 213). The sense of belonging that rise from being a ’reader’ puts 
the passive receiver in an active position eventually turning him to a 
transmitter. 
Rumors must disseminate in order to survive. As Guha puts it:  “To 
describe rumour as 'the lies of the Bazaar' is to wrap up in a pejorative the 
truth about its other tendency which is to originate in places where people 
assemble in large numbers” (Guha, 1999, p. 258). In Colonial India, Bazaar 
was the place where people assembled in large numbers, a public forum 
where for Turkey kıraathane (the coffee house) covered the same role. 
Today however there is a new public forum, where people all around the 
globe assemble in millions. 
The huge number of people using social media and the huge number of 
content that is shared via social media is not surprisingly about a huge 
number of topics. This creates an ecosystem with its own rules. With the 
information pollution that is created with the huge amount of content that 
is shared, users of social media need some criteria to avoid contents that 
are not worthy of their attention.  
This makes credibility of a social media account an important phenomenon. 
Those who are already known by the public like celebrities, journalists, 
politicians, etc. are given a higher account while other people that do not 
have an image in the public’s head outside social media need to work 
harder to gain more prestige. To reach more people with its social media 
account, one needs to differentiate itself from millions of other people. 
When the content they share is intriguing whether by its news value or just 
because it is interesting, the account acclaims popularity. 
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Popularity does not mean credibility yet it enables one’s social media 
account to be seen by many people and have a wider range of effect. 
Popularity in the long run can help one to gain credibility. A popular social 
media account has connections in the web to many people each with their 
own connections. Since a popular social media account is always in sight, 
more and more people begin to follow it. In the end, the way how a popular 
account became popular might lose its meaning and become credible as 
new people begin to follow it. 
During Gezi Resistance there were many rumors circulating on social 
media. The lack of information from mainstream media and the huge range 
of events created a fertile ground for rumors to grow and prosper. Social 
media took its place as the new medium in which rumor showed itself. As 
the public forum of the today’s world, social media with its vulnerabilities 
that come from the protocological control has allowed many rumors to 
spread and had a large influence during the Resistance.  
Liu et al.’s study shows us that the most important factor in rumor 
transmission is sender’s credibility on social media (Liu et al., 2014, p. 11). 
Oh et al.’s study also shows us that if a message that is shared on social 
media looks like a news report, it is more likely to be accepted and shared 
(Oh et al., 2013, p. 418). Shibutani showed us that a rumor’s acceptance 
relies on the reputation and past performance of the transmitter, and that 
receivers confront rumors with skepticism. (Shibutani, 1966, p. 73) 
To show how rumors are formed in order to increase their level of 
acceptance, I will show three cases of how rumors spread in different ways 
via social media during Gezi Resistance.  
4.2.1. Crediting the content to a known person, organization 
It is possible for people to use fake names and images in their social media 
accounts. One can use recognized people’s or organizations’ name and 
logos easily. Since the credibility of a social media account is high when its 
owner is regarded as a known person or organization, the effects of what 
is shared via such an account can have higher influence.  
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Figure 4.1. A Screenshot of @ntv_sondakika Twitter account 
The image above is from a Twitter account named @ntv_sondakika. 
Although this Twitter account has no connection to the NTV news 
organization, the profile of the account is formed in such a way that it 
implies it is owned by NTV. During Gezi Resistance many rumors spread 
through this account. These rumors included ones like the story that the 
İstanbul Police Commissioner had been taken from duty. (İnsan Haber, 
2013) 
 
Figure 4.2. A screenshot from @adaletmasasi Twitter account 
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The image above is a Tweet from the Twitter account @adaletmasasi., 
which is unreachable now. The tweet claims that municipal workers have 
found hundreds of used condoms in the tents on Gezi Park. The tweet dates 
back to 15 June 2013, the time of the Gezi Resistance. Although this 
account has no relation with the journalist Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, his 
photograph was used and this created the sense among people that it was 
Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı who wrote the tweet. 
 
Figure 4.3. Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı’s tweet (Kütahyalı, 2013) 
There were a lot of criticism of Rasim Ozan at that time and he later, in the 
image above, announced that he had no relation with whoever owned the 
Twitter account @adaletmasasi. This particular tweet shows that a rumor 
can spread via social media easily and be taken for granted when it is 
associated with someone that is known by the public. Rasim Ozan’s picture 
in that tweet and his association with the accusation towards the protestors 
had a great effect as can be seen in the other picture below, which is from 
Leman, a popular humor magazine. (Demokrathaber, 2013) 
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Figure 4.4 Leman’s caricature 
4.2.2. Using a content out of its intended context 
The Internet archives everything that is put on it, it never forgets. 
Something that was put online years ago might resurface years later even 
when the person who put it online has forgotten its existence. Further, with 
the spreadability properties of the Internet that content might be stored 
on someone’s hard disk and waiting to be put online again by someone 
with whom the content creator shares no connection except the fiber optic 
cables that circulate the globe. 
To support the dissemination of a rumor such content can be very useful. 
The content might have no connection with the rumor’s intention; however, 
the content in question can be recirculated in a new context, in a way that 
associates it with the entity or the person targeted by the rumor. 
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Figure 4.5. Boyner Holding’s 2013 poster for International Woman’s Day 
The image above was in circulation through social media during Gezi 
Resistance. (Milliyet, 2013) That image included Boyner Holding’s name 
and its brands along with a call to hit the streets. It was actually an old 
image from International Women’s Day. However, during Gezi Resistance 
this image began to circulate again in order to target Boyner Holding and 
imply that the company supports the protestors and Gezi Resistance by 
calling them out on the streets.  
Although the company later announced that the image was from their 
International Women’s Day campaign, the rumors against Boyner Holding 
had already been disseminated through social media. The tweet below is 
from Cem Boyner, the owner of Boyner Group. Cem Boyner tries to warn 
people about the recirculation of the newspaper advertisement that was 
used for International Women’s Day.  
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Figure 4.6 Cem Boyner’s tweet (Boyner, 2013) 
This rumor campaign against Boyner Holding shows how content can be 
used out of context regardless of the time it was first published. It also 
shows how it can turn into a tool aimed at changing people’s perception in 
two ways: by depicting in a way unrelated to its original purpose and by 
manipulating its meaning to support rumormonger’s cause.   
4.2.3. Manipulating content 
It is very easy for one to manipulate a document with the computer 
technologies at hand today. Even simple free software can successfully 
manipulate a media file, and more advanced software allow a vast range 
of manipulation. Take image manipulation for example. With advanced 
software, a photograph of a person can be used to put that person in very 
different places. Such technologies allow rumors a good opportunity to gain 
credibility. The ability to manipulate media files in such context allows 
rumormongers an important tool to support their efforts of rumor 
dissemination. 
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Figure 4.7. A manipulated image of Woman in Red Dress 
Another instance of rumormongering through social media during Gezi 
Resistance was seen in an edited image that was circulated. The image 
above claimed that the photograph by Reuters photojournalist Osman 
Örsal was not taken in Gezi Resistance but was instead from a studio shoot. 
The text surrounding the image tells that the Woman in Red is actually an 
actor and call on Gezi protestors to recognize that they are on the wrong 
side. This example of a rumor created via content manipulation helped 
those who were against the Resistance by promoting the sense that the 
brutal police intervention was not real but staged. 
4.3. Rumor under Protocological Control 
As I previously summarized in the chapter about protocological control, 
protocols are “certain pre-agreed ‘scientific’ rules of the system” 
(Galloway, 2004, p. 38). Protocols are the main control mechanisms of 
distributed networks. Social media are also formed as distributed networks 
working under protocological control, where the input from users can take 
only several forms like images, videos, and text.  
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The protocols governing social media are indifferent to the messages input 
carries, they only look if they meet their requirements, they can put a limit 
on the amount of characters, size of the data, source of content, etc. They 
are logical agents that can operate only on the level of form. Their 
dependence on logical rules on the form makes protocols open for exploits.  
One common practice social media users apply in order to beat 
protocological control can be seen when one shares links to other websites 
with Uniform Resource Locators (URL). A URL is the address for a specific 
website, it is what is shown in a web browser’s address bar. When giving 
a URL to another website is forbidden by the protocols or a URL to a specific 
website is limited, there is an easy way to get rid of that limitation most 
social media users know of. It is done by leaving empty spaces between 
the characters of the URL that one wishes to share. Protocols understand 
such content as text and allow them to be shared, whereas users of social 
media can see a link to another website is shared and can fix it in order to 
visit that website.  
This shows that logical control principle of protocols rely on the syntax. A 
link to another website might be banned by the protocological control but 
by putting spaces between the characters of URL, rather than being seen 
as a content in the form of a URL, the input is seen in the form of a text. 
The user who sees such a content can understand its semantics and can 
visit the given URL by deleting the empty spaces.  
The ability to understand the illogical relations between the syntax and 
semantics allows social media users to beat the protocological control. 
Putting spaces between the characters of a URL is just a simple example. 
Texts, images and video content that is shared can also contain illogical 
relations, which can hack the control mechanisms of a social network. 
Rumors are agents of language, they rise on communication and help to 
comprehend situations by binding explanations to them. The content that 
is shared on social media as its shown before can only take several forms 
all of which also offers some definition, explanation. Rumors find 
themselves an excellent environment to batten and disseminate in social 
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media. The anonymity of rumor is protected with the speed of 
communication on a virtual environment where efforts to trace the origin 
lack. 
Today rumors spread through social media and they have an influence on 
the users of social media. Galloway’s work showed that a resistance 
towards the protocols governing social media is available within the 
protocological control field. Rumors can in some cases become harmful 
informational agents but they can also be seen as resistive tools towards 
protocological control.  
Shibutani described oral interchange as the signifying characteristic of 
rumors (Shibutani, 1966, pp. 3,4), and Guha has called it the classical form 
of anonymous speech (Guha, 1999, p. 251). In contrast, according to 
Spivak, with its belonging to every reader/receiver (Spivak, 2006, p. 213), 
rumors show the main characteristics of writing. I believe that with the 
protocological control the form of rumor, whether as speech or writing, 
becomes less significant, but that the function of rumor gains more 
importance. In the end, rumors are agents of language, which cannot be 
controlled by the protocols governing distributed networks because they 
are in acceptable forms. 
The implied meanings within the language give rumors their functionality 
and they become tactical tools capable of hacking protocological control 
with the affective properties they carry. It is impossible to figure out the 
function and the semantics of rumor from accurate, verified information 
for the protocological control mechanisms of the distributed networks. This 
gave social media and rumor an important role in Gezi Resistance. 
During Gezi Resistance there were doubts on the protestors’ side about the 
accuracy of the information flow on social media. In the text messages and 
social media content they sent to each other, the protestors demanded 
verification about the information that was in circulation. Hence rumor was 
as much a concern to the protestors as it was to the governmental 
authorities.   
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This was because during the events, especially in the first couple of days, 
mainstream media failed to inform the public, and social media became a 
major source of information. Under such circumstances, it was quite 
natural for everyone to receive information through social media while at 
the same time demanding verification.    
Eventually, it can be said that both supporters and dissidents were 
influenced by rumor during the Resistance. Rumor became an important 
instrument to avoid the ambiguity of the situation. The flow of unverified 
information through social media caused each side to adopt the information 
that fit into its understanding/expectation of the situation.  
Rumors were created in a similar manner where one’s own understanding 
or the expectation of the situation was used as a starting point for 
overcoming the ambiguity of the situation. This resulted in the creation of 
information without verified sources. Personal explanations and 
expectations were put in circulation resulting in new rumors, which 
encapsulated the understanding/expectation of their creators. 
In the end, by adopting or by creating the most useful information that fit 
into their understanding of the situation, both dissidents and supporters of 
the Resistance used rumors in order to avoid ambiguity and spread those 
rumors in order to influence others. 
Social media enables its users to share and re-share, and the user’s 
participation becomes essential in the flow of information. Like in rumor, 
information is constantly filtered, modified and altered by the user. Once 
reliant on oral interchange in pre-industrial, illiterate populations, rumors 
now had a nurturing environment, which allowed them to spread with more 
speed thanks to the help of new communication technologies, namely 
social media. People who have access to these new communication 
technologies with their devices changed the nature of rumor.  
Subjective information has become the prominent content throughout the 
network with the constantly filtered, modified, and altered information by 
the users of social media. The flow of subjective information involved the 
affects from their creators with their active role in information 
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dissemination. Rumors are also spread in a similar manner through social 
media enabling them to gain the important role they have in social 
movements of today.   
Rumor has played the role of mobilizer and trigger in many uprisings, as 
Guha shown in his work (Guha, 1999, p. 254). With the change in nature 
of rumor, its role as mobilizer and trigger is more powerful than ever. Social 
media now plays the role played by rumor during the peasant uprisings in 
the past. With its ability to transmit information from anyone to anyone 
with great speed and in many forms, social media has made rumor more 
than an oral interchange or form of anonymous speech or writing. Rumor 
as an agent of language has now become a tool that can hack through 
protocols governing social media thus allowing social media to become an 
important tactical tool to any insurgency movement.  
Rumor in most cases is seen as an instrument to disinform, it is presumed 
as a tool that is used to create false beliefs in the public’s eyes and to 
provoke events that might have consequences. It is true that both rumor 
bombs via mainstream media and rumormongering through social media 
can be used to achieve such goals, however it is also true that rumors are 
created to overcome the ambiguity of a situation and can be useful to make 
sense about what is going on.  
4.4. More than (Dis)Information 
Do rumors serve only to spread information or disinformation? I argue that 
rumors are not solely informational agents. They are more like a medium 
that contain information in addition to other things. Rumors are unverified 
information, but they are also carrier of much else.  
Rumor carries, as Guha argued “hopes and fears, of visions of doomsdays 
and golden ages, of secular objectives and religious longings, all of which 
made up the stuff that fired the minds of men” (Guha, 1999, p. 256). 
Allport and Postman have shown that with leveling, sharpening, and 
assimilation rumors go through processes that make them more effective 
(Allport & Postman, 1965, pp. 75,86,115). Slanting is another important 
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factor, which is used to create a certain impression by adding and removing 
certain details (Shibutani, 1966, p. 44). 
All these at hand I believe that rumors are not just informational 
statements. Rumors, among their other properties, have affective 
properties, which make them so important. They are the carriers and 
creators of affects. Rumors work as medium that helps to spread and 
create affects and through that property they have an important role in 
society. 
Rumors can be igniters of events or they can have important effects on 
ongoing events. Gezi Resistance was triggered by rumors about the park’s 
demolition in order to build Topçu Barracks.  Rumors continued to have an 
important role throughout the Resistance. 
During the protests one particular rumor spread through social media and 
word of mouth is especially noteworthy. That rumor stated that the 
government would fall if the protests continued for another 48 hours. I 
believe this rumor is closely related to another social media activity, which 
was a call for the protestors to return their homes.  
The campaign on social media that called on protestors to stop proved 
ineffective due to the rumors of the government’s potential fall. Protestors 
who have been bothered with the campaign found a new source of hope 
and motivation with the rumors that the government would fall if they 
continued for 48 hours and stayed in the Resistance. 
Another rumor was put in circulation repeatedly during the conflicts with 
the police. The rumor was about several thousand protestors marching 
from Gazi District to Taksim. During heavy conflicts such rumors had an 
effect on keeping the protestors on the streets behind their barricades and 
had been a source of motivation. 
Recently we experienced how rumors have an effect on our everyday lives. 
The fear people experienced after the explosions in Ankara and İstanbul 
intensified with the rumors that spread through social media. Reports from 
intelligence agencies and embassies about expected bombings were 
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disseminated through social media. Such rumors reached the masses via 
social media and created a situation where people were afraid to go on to 
the streets and continue on with their everyday lives. 
Does this make rumors a threat to organized everyday lives? Are rumors 
dangerous agents that might harm a society? I believe the question for 
that answer is both a yes and a no. Rumors can be dangerous but they can 
also prove useful in order to reach certain goals.  
The relatively democratic distribution of the tools that enable 
communication through social media creates a flow of unverified 
information nowadays. Everyone can put some information online, whether 
true or false. Under such circumstances, it is an important effort to verify 
the level of truth in this information. 
I believe a discussion on ethics is necessary under these circumstances.  
Andrew Keen’s critical book The Cult of the Amateur gives some useful 
insights about the discussion of ethics. According to Keen “the most 
popular blogs are those that offer the seductive conspiracy theories and 
sensationalist antiestablishment platitudes that readers crave” (Keen, 
2007, p. 54). In his work about citizen journalism, he uses the example of 
Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath. He claims that the efforts of citizen 
journalists only helped to spread rumors, which were then falsified by the 
traditional news media (Keen, 2007, p. 48). 
Another important point Keen makes is about a comparison of the 
consequences for the lack of accountability between citizen journalists and 
traditional news media. Keen argues:  
Bloggers are very rarely sued or prosecuted because the 
government and corporations don't seem to really care what they 
write. As a result, they aren't held accountable for their work in the 
way that real reporters are. (Keen, 2007, p. 50) 
Even though Keen’s book was published as recently as 2007, nine years is 
still a lot of time especially when we talk about new media. For example 
the Turkish law no. 5651, which also has been effective since 2007, is 
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about online crimes and it involves citizen journalists as well. The number 
of libel suits involving President Erdoğan shows that Keen’s claims are not 
valid anymore. (BİANET, 2016)  
It is important to note that in 2016, citizen journalists are no longer bound 
to the blogs Keen describes. Although the blogs still exist, social media 
accounts cover a more significant part of information transmission today.  
In a speech he gave at the Bruno Kreisky Prize ceremony, Jürgen 
Habermas shows another intriguing insight. He states that: 
The price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism offered by the 
Internet is the decentralized access to unedited stories. In this 
medium, contributions by intellectuals lose their power to create a 
focus. (Habermas, 2006)  
The preference of popularity against prestige is what Habermas signals. He 
shows that the influence of popular exceeds the influence of the prestigious 
in the decentralized social networks. The preference of the popular instead 
of credible allow rumors an important opportunity. 
Rumors with information also carry affects, and that property of rumors 
have considerable effects. Rumormongers that seek to achieve a goal 
might be willing to take advantage of the affective properties of rumors. 
Verification of the information one finds on social media gains importance 
under these circumstances. 
The verification of the information that flows through the Internet has 
gained great importance nowadays. Saka shows that with the involvement 
of citizens in news progress, information credibility and citizen journalism 
have become important topics (Saka, 2015). There have been several 
attempts to help people see if the information they receive is accurate. 
Many studies have been done to widen people’s ability to check the 
accuracy of the information they receive and to make verification a habit 
when they seek information on the Internet. 
  
65 
 
Verification Handbook3 is a useful source, which has been translated to 
Turkish and other languages. It is a free eBook published with the 
contributions of many experts. The eBook aims to increase the accuracy of 
news reports in times of emergencies when social media fills up with 
rumors.  
Also included in the team that translated the Verification Handbook to 
Turkish was pioneering activist Mehmet Atakan Foça, a Turkish journalist. 
He has a website4 where he verifies news and reports that flow through 
mainstream and social media in a crowdsourced manner, collaborating with 
other activists interested in content verification. He also uses his social 
media accounts for the same goal, allowing him to get in touch with those 
who are responsible for false reports. Recently he appeared as a guest in 
mainstream media (Foça, 2015), which I believe, is a great sign of how 
important a factor verification has become in the online environment. 
The accuracy of information today has become very important, since with 
the high amount of content that flows through social media there is 
excessive information and too little credibility. But the verification of 
information is not the only concern one has when faced with rumors on 
social media. 
Affects that can be aroused via rumor dissemination present themselves 
as another important ethical concern. When a rumor is designed to reach 
a goal by its affective properties, ethical concerns for its outcome can be 
disregarded. Thus, I believe that the efforts of verification are well 
intentioned yet once the rumor is spread it would be harder to diminish its 
consequences. 
In the end, rumors should not be regarded only with their informational 
properties. They are natural and necessary agents. They carry people’s 
hopes, dreams, and utopias and have important affective roles. The ethical 
concern of rumor spread is an important, yet the ethical concerns of one 
                                                          
3 http://verificationhandbook.com/ 
4 http://matakanfoca.com/ 
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party might allow the opposing party a fertile ground for rumors that could 
ignite widespread outbreaks and social changes.  
4.5. Affect in Social Media 
The concept of protocological control shows that distributed networks do 
not lack an authority and control mechanism. On social media the 
governing protocols are the gatekeepers, which decide what can be taken 
inside the network and what will be rejected. They are the agents of 
authority and control.  
In De Certeauesque terms, protocols are strategic agents: “every 
‘strategic’ rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its ‘own’ place, that 
is, the place of its own power and will, from an ‘environment’” (De Certeau, 
1984, p. 36). Strategies define the space in which they operate and decide 
who can reach that space and what can be done inside their boundaries. 
Protocols work in the same manner and they control which content in what 
form and in what size can have a place inside the network.  
Rumors in social media become tactical tools. Rumors, as I claimed earlier, 
do not only carry information. They include subjective properties, which 
turn them into affective agents. These affective properties allow rumors to 
take the role as tools that can hack protocologial control.  
Rumors historically played an important role in social events. They spread 
through the old public forums like the bazaar, or coffee house where people 
assembled in large numbers. Today social media take the role of such 
public forums, which are nurturing environments for rumors to prosper and 
spread.  
Social media are the virtual space that people assemble in large numbers 
today. As Dahlgren shows, social media reinforce a horizontal 
communication where affect along with information can be shared 
(Dahlgren, 2012). A content put on social media can reach to masses very 
fast, social media allow it to access new people and increase its 
prominence. 
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Social media can be used easily around the globe with an active Internet 
connection. The democratized access to social media enables billions of 
people to have a chance of encountering, engaging, and creating. The 
content of social media comes from the users. Thus, the contents on social 
media carry subjective elements from their creators, they are also 
constantly filtered and altered by other subjectivities as they spread 
through the network from individual to individual. 
The choice of words, the construction of a sentence, images used, the 
absence of some words, the tone of voice, the choice of emojis, and all 
other subjective choices become, which involve affects become 
semantically significant even though their significance cannot be 
understood by the protocols governing social media. Rumors gain their 
tactical role in social media similarly through protocol’s ignorance of 
semantics.  
Rumors are agents that carry affects, they involve understandings and 
expectations of those who take part in their dissemination. Affective 
properties of the rumor on social media can have huge effects on everyday 
practices because they are able to hack through protocological control and 
create affects on the individuals that take a role in their dissemination. 
In events that concern many people the amount of ambiguity rises, and 
the sources of information become inadequate. Consequently, individuals 
using social media begin to create and disseminate rumors that not only 
carry information but also reflections of subjectivity from those who involve 
with their dissemination.  
The main characteristic of rumor is its dissemination from individual to 
individual. Leveling, sharpening, assimilation, and plasticity phenomenon 
have important roles on rumor’s ability to spread. Same phenomenon are 
also at play on turning rumors into affective agents. In every step of their 
dissemination, rumors keep changing and altering their details in a way to 
become more acceptable. They become more and more concentrated on 
affect arousal. Rumors become creator of affects by evolving through their 
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dissemination in a way where they directly address to the receivers’ 
sensitivities.    
Rumors with their affect creator roles on social media can have huge 
consequences. They can be the first steps for big events, like the rumor of 
Gezi Park’s demolishment, which created the sense ‘enough of this!’ and 
triggered the Resistance. They can have important effects after events, like 
the fear that reigned over everyday life after bombing incidents with 
rumors about potential terrorist attacks.   
It is only natural to approach the content on social media with skepticism, 
and it is important to try and verify the information that is disseminated. 
However, like in rumor the content on social media goes through subjective 
filters of its users.  
Affective properties of social media content become important resources 
that are helpful for understanding the concerns of public. To disregard such 
an important resource and to look down on them is a mistake just as how 
was rumor treated before. Rumor was never only unverified information. 
Alongside its informational properties, it carried hopes, fears, dreams, and 
nightmares. It was also a medium, which carried subjective elements from 
those involved with it. With such properties, rumors had an important role 
in society.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Social media today has a huge impact on our everyday lives. Everyone with 
an active internet connection has a chance to reach social media sites. The 
mobility of technological devices that have access to the Internet allows 
one to reach social media anywhere, anytime.  
Social media has become the public forum of today where people assemble 
in large numbers. The huge number of people that have access to social 
media creates a great amount of content wherein one can find any kind of 
information shaped by varying intentions and formats.  
Protocols that govern social media work as gatekeepers, which accept the 
content that fits in the format and syntax they define, and reject the 
others. As logical agents, protocols have an important weakness. They are 
indifferent to semantics, other meanings content might carry even though 
it fits the syntax defined by protocols.  
The content that is shared in social media is mostly personal reports. They 
can be videos of cats, images of food, aphorisms after a breakup and many 
more. When it comes to big events, which is a concern for a large 
proportion of the population, like social movements, terrorist attacks, or 
coup attempts, the subjective properties of the content that is put on social 
media may become a concern. 
Rumors in most cases are seen as unverified information. They arise in 
situations where ambiguity is high and personal involvement with the 
situation is high. They are attempts to make sense out of a situation where 
the supply of reliable information cannot meet the demand. They have also 
been an important factor in social movements, where not only the 
information they are carrying but the way they carry the information also 
matters.  
The relatively democratic distribution of the ability to reach social media 
creates a nurturing environment for rumors to circulate. In big events that 
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have a consequence for large numbers of people, personal reports on social 
media can be seen as news reports and personal statements can turn into 
being catalysts and igniters for bigger events.  
Rumors are mostly seen with their negative properties when they are solely 
seen as informational statements that aim to provoke events through 
either true or false reports. However, rumors are not solely informational 
agents formed as objective reports. They do not only carry some 
information regarding a situation. Rumors as agents of language are also 
carriers of affects that contain subjective properties within them.  
Today, with the rise of social media and its easiness to reach the masses, 
rumors have evolved. They no longer use the medium of word of mouth in 
physical places. Rather than that, the virtual space of social media where 
people assemble in billions are now the birthplace of rumors. New 
phenomena that became apparent with the rise of social media like 
spreadability show how effective social media is when it comes to 
disseminating information through its network.  
The social media content consists of personal reports that include affects 
with their subjective properties. In social media, such content has a 
potential to break through the protocological control mechanisms of 
distributed networks. Because of their affective properties, the subjective 
information on social media can cause events that cannot be foreseen.  
The choice of words, the construction of a sentence, images used, the 
absence of some words, the tone of voice, and the choice of emojis are 
semantically significant even though they cannot be understood by the 
protocols governing distributed networks. Protocols are strategic agents 
that define the area they govern by accepting formats that fit into their 
understanding. The semantically significant variations within language can 
be used as tactical tools that can overcome the protocological control 
mechanism of the network with their affective properties.  
I believe rumors have a big role when they are spread through social media 
during big events. They are designed and refined to carry affections 
through their dissemination within a network. They carry the dreams, 
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nightmares, expectations along with them. They contaminate mediators 
with affections, which can become the mobilizer and catalyst for bigger 
events.  
In the end, rumors should not be seen as purely negative phenomena that 
aim to disinform or provoke further events but rather as agents of 
language, which can be used as tactical tools that are able to overcome 
strict protocological control mechanisms with their affective properties.  
This study was intended to analyze the effects of rumor in social media 
during Gezi Resistance. However, by the time the study was conducted 
many other “big events” had happened. All those events have found 
themselves a place on social media and many rumors have been circulated 
about them.  
The way rumor was used during these “big events” was not only through 
social media. Even mainstream media institutions, political actors, and 
journalists spread rumors in order to gain tactical advantage about 
developments regarding the “big event.” The rumors were designed to 
create certain affects and they resulted in consequences through everyday 
life practices   
The way institutions and individuals that have a certain prestige in people’s 
minds use rumor as tactical tools in order to influence the perception of 
individuals is a good further research opportunity. I believe, especially after 
the recent coup d’état event, further study on social media phenomena like 
Fuat Avni and how they use both true and false information as a tactical 
tool can also be formulated into an extended research project. 
I also find it important here to note that, although social media are under 
protocological control as well as the Internet, governmental agencies still 
have some hierarchical power in their jurisdiction, which eventually can be 
bypassed with some technical knowledge. Nevertheless, censorship is still 
a common practice in Turkish online sphere and stands as a problematic 
issue. A rather new practice by governmental agencies is throttling the 
bandwidth. This method is used mostly when the targeted sites are too 
popular. Further study on the effects of bandwidth throttle and 
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development of tools that are aimed overcome it will be necessary in the 
long run. 
Finally, I find it necessary to note here that the power distribution within 
social media is also an important concern. Most of the popular social media 
platforms are profit oriented organizations. As a result, any movement that 
is organized and triggered with the opportunities presented by such social 
media platforms are constantly under threat.  
The pursuit of profit is the primary goal of these platforms and the 
tolerance towards social movements can disappear in an instant once they 
become a threat for the pursuit of profit. I believe there will be an 
increasing need towards a non-profit driven social media platform, which 
can appeal to everyday users at some point. I believe researching the 
opportunities towards such a social media platform would serve a very 
important purpose and would be a necessary wrestle in the near future.  
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